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ABSTRACT
An important issue in public finance is concerned with finding an appropriate 
choice-theoretic model for explaining state and local government fiscal behavior. 
Economists have traditionally viewed state and local expenditure and tax decision-making 
processes "as i f  they were the results of utility maximization subject to a budget 
constraint. This approach provides a convenient device for applying the neoclassical 
demand theory to state and local public sector fiscal behavior. The appropriateness of 
making such an assumption has, however, not been directly addressed in the literature.
This research fills the gap by empirically testing whether the assumption of utility 
maximization holds in local public sector by using data drawn fi"om Taiwan for the 1986- 
94 period. Taiwan’s local public sector employment and spending data reflects weaker 
voter constraints on local bureaucracies, thus providing a unique opportunity for definitive 
direct tests o f whether or not one can model bureaucratic behaviors as an “as if ’ 
constrained optimization outcome. Both parametric and nonparametric test procedures are 
performed. For parametric tests, a translog utility function is specified. For nonparametric 
tests, a method that is based on the theory of revealed preference is applied.
Additional tests are also performed. The sensitivity analysis allows this dissertation 
study to test the robustness of the results from nonparametric tests. The probit analysis of 
jurisdiction-specific factors determining consistency with the revealed preference axioms 
provides additional insight into local public sector fiscal behavior in Taiwan.
Overall results from this research provide a strong support for the assumption of 
bureaucratic utility maximizing behavior in Taiwan’s local public sector. The empirical
Vlll
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evidence not only supports the hypothesis that the local bureaucracies have well-defined 
preferences over public sector employment and spending, but also indicates the 
intertemporal stability in the preference structures across individual local public 
bureaucracies in Taiwan.
This dissertation shows that the “as i f ’ proposition in the public finance literature 
is justified. The results fi-om this dissertation research therefore significantly provide the 
first definitive direct empirical support for this popular assumption in the literature.
IX
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
One important issue in public finance concerns the appropriate choice-theoretic 
economic structural model of state and local government fiscal behavior. In an effort to 
explain intequrisdictional variations in public spending, economists have traditionally 
applied the neoclassical demand theory to state and local government fiscal behavior by 
either explicitly or implicitly assuming that the government fiscal choices reflect the utility 
maximization behavior of consumers/voters. Constrained optimization models, such as 
Barr and Davis (1966), Henderson (1968), Gramlich (1969a), and Inman (1971), and 
median voter models, such as Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and Goodman
(1973), and Inman (1978), represent such an approach. A broader public choice approach, 
while rejecting the indifference curve analysis as being inappropriate, is not totally fi-ee of 
the utility maximizing agent assumption: instead of assuming utility maximization by 
voters/taxpayers, it often implicitly assumes utility maximization by bureaucrats or 
politicians, whether constrained by or interacting with voter/taxpayers preferences [e.g. 
Tullock (1972,1974); Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979b, 1982); Denzau, Mackay, and 
Weaver (1979); Ott (1980); and Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982)]. The bureaucratic 
models, especially those of Niskanen (1968,1971,1975), are representatives o f this latter 
approach.
This dissertation research seeks to answer the question: do bureaucrats maximize 
anything? That is, does the public sector bureaucracy behave in a systematic fashion? 
Existing literature on state and local government fiscal behavior has at various stages
1
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2identified four utility-maximization groups of agents in local public finance: 
voters/taxpayers; public service recipients; politicians holding public office; and public 
sector bureaucrats. Each group has an interest in, and varying degree o f capacity to afTect, 
the outcome of local public sector decision-making process. Various combinations of the 
interaction among these four groups of agents generate different economic behavioral 
models of local government spending. The common feature o f all these models is the role 
o f voter/taxpayers as constraints on politicians and bureaucrats.
Regardless of their methodological differences in modeling local government fiscal 
behavior, these models typically view the process of state and local public expenditures and 
tax decisions "as if' it were the result of utility maximization subject to a budget constraint. 
Attempts to evaluate the median voter hypothesis implicitly test the utility maximization 
and the preference aggregation assumptions embodied in the hypothesis [Inman (1978), 
McEachem (1978), Pommerehne (1978), Holcombe (1980), Gramlich and Rubinfeld 
(1982), Romer and Rosenthal (1979a, 1979b, 1982), Deno and Mehay (1987), Wyckoff 
(1988), TumbuU and Djoundourian (1994), and Means and Mehay (1995)]. The empirical 
evidence, however, is mixed, depending on data set used and the empirical specification. 
Direct tests of optimization behavior are almost non-existing, with the two exceptions of 
Grosskopf and Hayes (1983) and DeBoer (1986). Overall, all these above-cited studies fail 
to provide a definitive answer to the fimdamental questions concerned with how reasonable 
the assumption of utility maximization really is or even whose utility it is that is being 
maximized. Herein lies the motivation for this dissertation research: to directly test the 
utility maximization hypothesis in local public expenditure models.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3There are two ways to empirically test whether or not the assumption o f utility 
maximization holds. The first, and also the most fiequently used, method is to perform 
parametric test procedures on a set of observed public sector spending data by estimating 
an explicit utility fimction and testing the parametric restrictions. The second is to perform 
nonstatistical nonparametric tests based on the theory of revealed preference. This 
dissertation research uses both methods. For the parametric tests, a translog utility function 
as in Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975) will be specified to test the utility 
maximization hypothesis. One of the major advantages of a translog utility specification 
is its flexible functional form, thus avoiding making additional urmecessary a priori 
assumptions about the underlying preferences o f the model that are to be tested. For the 
nonparametric tests, the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) as in Varian 
(1982, 1983) will be used. A more detailed description of these two types of test 
procedures, as well as their relative strengths and weaknesses, will be discussed in Chapter
3.
This research uses the local public sector spending data drawn firom Taiwan's 
publicly released sources fiom 1986 to 1994. Taiwan, though not an independent country 
de jure, has been a de facto nation since 1949.' It is a country undergoing a series of rapid 
political transformations during the past decade. Despite the development o f democratic 
institutions in recent years, the political-budgeting process during the period firom which
‘See, for example. Copper (1990) for the post-World War II history of Taiwan’s legal 
status and its political culture, tradition and system. These factors provide the rationale for 
choosing a bureaucratic model, rather than one based on consumer choice theory, for this 
dissertation research.
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4the data set is drawn is very different from that of the United States or o f other western 
democratic societies. One can safely assert that the public sector bureaucracy in Taiwan 
is less constrained by voters/taxpayers than the bureaucracy in the typical western 
representative democracy, although the situation is rapidly changing in recent years. To 
a large extent, Taiwan's local politicians and public bureaucracy depend on 
intergovernmental grants and aids to meet their annual budget.^ Lower-level governments, 
other than the national government, do not have the constitutional or legal power to impose 
taxes, revise tax rates, or hold referenda on tax issues.^ By way of contrast, take the fiscal 
institutions of the United States as an example. The fiscal structure o f the United States 
reflects the federalist spirit that is deeply embedded in its constitution, under which not 
only the federal government is empowered to conduct fiscal transactions, but also the state 
governments have sovereign rights in taxing and spending powers, although with certain 
restrictions. Local governments, though do not have sovereign powers o f their own, also 
have fiscal powers that are granted by the states.'*
The fiscal arrangements of Taiwan, unlike those of the United States, have always 
been centralized. As such, Taiwan's public sector spending data provides a unique
^See, for example, Lin and Lee (1989, pp. 5-20). It is reported that, among the sixteen 
Hsiens and five Municipalities, seven of these local governments received inter- 
goverrunental grants and aids that accounted for an average of fifty-four percent o f their 
annual budget in the 1982-86 period. For all local governments at this administrative level, 
the average is forty-one percent in the same period.
^See Huang (1989, pp. 3-22) for a detailed description of Taiwan’s institutional 
arrangements with regard to its central-local government fiscal responsibilities.
‘*For a more detailed account of the fiscal arrangements in the United States, see, for 
example, Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, pp. 27-46).
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5opportunity to test theories o f bureaucratic behavior. Taiwan's data, reflecting weaker 
voter/taxpayer constraints on public sector bureaucrats and politicians, presents the 
opportunity for definitive tests o f whether or not one can model bureaucratic behaviors as 
an "as if ' constrained optimization outcome. A more detailed explanation of the data set 
will also be given in Chapter 3.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews extant literature on 
models o f state and local government fiscal behavior. Chapter 3 describes the empirical 
models and the parametric and nonparametric test procedures, as well as the data set drawn 
from Taiwan's publicly released sources. Additional test procedures and empirical 
statistical results from this research will be reported in Chapter 4. The last chapter, which 
concludes this dissertation, will provide discussions o f the empirical results as well as 
possible avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL BEHAVIOR
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews extant literature on models o f state and local government 
fiscal behavior. Based on the methodological development of these models, they are 
broadly divided into three categories: ad hoc expenditure determinants models, constrained 
maximization models, and public choice models.
The median voter models and the bureaucratic models that will be reviewed below 
are merely subsets of the more encompassing models known as the public choice models. 
Constrained maximization models, median voter models and the latter*s variants all are 
applications of standard consumer choice theory. The public choice approach to state and 
local government expenditures, however, distinguishes from the consumer choice theory- 
based approach in that the former explicitly rejects the indifference curve analysis in favor 
of modeling the unit based on the actual political process within which public decisions on 
expenditures and taxation are made [see, for example, Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko 
(1980)].
According to Mueller (1976, p. 395), the public choice approach to public finance 
"can be defined as the economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or, simply the 
application of economics to political science." The median voter models follow the public 
choice approach to the extent that they introduce an explicit political decision-making 
process. Because it reduces the political process to a representative constrained
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7maximization problem, however, the median voter model approach is viewed as 
inappropriate from the broader public choice perspective.
The following evaluates critically each of these approaches.
2.2 Ad Hoc Spending Determinants Modek
How is the size o f the local public sector determined? And, what are the 
deteraainants o f state and local government expenditures? Questions such as these are the 
principal subject o f a growing body of literature beginning with Solomon Fabricant's 
(1952) seminal NBER book on government spending [Bahl (1968, 1969); Fredland
(1974)]. In his chapter on interstate differences in government activity, Fabricant uses a 
single-equation multiple regression analysis on cross-sectional per capita state and local 
government expenditures in 1942 and finds that personal income, degree of urbanization 
and population density together account for about 72 percent o f the variation in state per 
capita total expenditures. O f these three factors, personal income is found to be the most 
important variable. Fisher (1961,1964) extends Fabricant's analysis to find that both the 
absolute level and distribution of income are important determinants of government 
spending.
After Fabricant and Fisher, there has been a proliferation of expenditure 
determinants studies that seek to identify new variables explaining the growth or 
differences in state and local government expenditures. For example, Hirsch (1960) studies 
the public education expenditures o f school districts in St. Louis county and concludes that 
per pupil assessed property value is the most important determinant of local expenditures 
on public education. Kumow (1963) uses a multiplicative regression model rather than the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8additive models in either the Fabricant or Fisher study. In addition to the above-mentioned 
three basic factors, Kumow adds federal grants and a measure o f the quality o f public 
services to his regression equation. Sack and Harris (1964) compare the results from 
Fabricant (1952) and Fisher (1961) with those derived from their study with federal and 
state aid as additional explanatory variables. Bahl and Saunders (1966), however, question 
the use of federal aid as a determinant o f state and local public spending on the ground that 
the direction of causality between expenditures and grants is not clear. In addition, their 
semi-log equation results do not support Kumow’s non-additive variant of the basic 
regression model. They also conclude that state and local government spending should be 
analyzed by specific category or function rather than aggregated general expenditures.
Sharkansky (1967) separates state government spending from that of local 
government and includes in his analysis lagged expenditures as an important determinant. 
He argues that previous expenditures have profound statistical and theoretical relevance 
for current-period expenditures. That is, previous expenditures serve as a base in the 
determination o f current-period expenditures in the techniques o f incremental budgeting. 
Gramlich (1969b) distinguishes different types of federal grants (unconditional vs. 
matching) and their effects of state and local government spending and concludes that 
earlier empirical studies on this subject are confusing and inadequate. Weicher (1970) 
extends the usual determinants analysis by taking account o f tastes and service conditions 
as additional factors in explaining local public spending. Racial and ethnic composition 
of the population, educational level of the adult population and age distribution of the 
population are used as measures of "tastes", whereas population density, the existence of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9slums, the age of the housing unit, and the existence o f crowding within a dwelling unit are 
employed as measures o f the "service conditions".
According to Bahl (1969), there have been more than 75 determinants studies up 
to 1969. And in Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980), more than 150 determinants studies 
are cited for review. Despite the large number of these early determinants studies, they 
provide no definitive answers to the question o f why state and local government fiscal 
behavior differs among jurisdictions [Bahl (1968, 1969); Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko 
(1980); Inman (1979)]. Failure of the early determinants studies to produce satisfactory 
explanations can generally be summarized by the following criticisms of the methodologies 
used in those studies on both conceptual and empirical grounds. First, and the most serious 
problem of all, the early determinants studies are based on nothing more than an ad hoc 
model that includes variables that seem to work empirically. Fabricant himself admits that 
"[tjracing relationships between government activity and the factors affecting it involves 
a good deal o f speculation" [1952, p. 122, italics added]. Lack of a generally acceptable 
theoretical fimnework may cause relevant variables to be omitted firom, and irrelevant 
variables to be included in, the model specifications, resulting in possibly biased parameter 
estimates.
Second, the determinants studies typically use aggregated data o f state and local 
government spending, while disaggregated data is arguably more appropriate for 
jurisdiction-level policy analysis. Bahl (1968), Morss (1966), and Inman (1979) point out 
that the aggregation bias in estimates may be large, thus providing little information about 
the factors that affect the expenditure decisions o f a particular government unit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
Third, the comparability of expenditure data across governmental units poses 
another serious problem because of intequrisdictional differences in the nature of 
functional responsibilities as well as the externality effects o f jurisdictional spending. Thus 
failure to distinguish expenditures, say, in the city area fix>m those by the city government 
will generally yield erroneous empirical results [Bahl (1968)].
Fourth, the inclusion of intergovernmental aid as an exogenous variable in the 
regression equation explaining expenditures introduces an element of circularity since total 
expenditures are equal to the sum of expenditures from own sources and expenditures from 
intergovernmental sources. Therefore, the strong correlation of grants with expenditures 
contributes little to our understanding of the pattern o f intequrisdictional spending 
differences. Also, for certain types of grants the direction o f causality is actually reversed, 
that is, the level of grants is determined by the level o f expenditures [Bahl (1968,1969); 
Fisher (1964); Gramlich (1969b); Morss (1966); Bahl and Saunders (1966)]. And finally, 
improper specifications of the grants variable (i.e. matching vs. non-matching) may lead 
to inconsistent estimates of the effect of total aid, since lump-sum aid as a pure budget 
transfer has a different effect on expenditure decisions from matching aid as a price 
reduction for the aided services [Gramlich (1969b); Inman (1979)].
It is in response to these shortcomings of the early determinants models that later 
structural empirical models based on constrained maximization models or median voter 
models were developed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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23  Constrained Maximization Modek
Modeling state and local government fiscal behavior within a fiamework of utility 
maximization represents a major attempt by public finance economists to provide a 
theoretical basis upon which to build and interpret empirical analyses.
Barr and Davis (1966) use the traditional tools o f economic analysis to develop a 
"political" theory of local government expenditures. In their theoretical model, each 
individual (consumer/voter) maximizes his or her utility, which is a fimction of privately 
consumed goods and the expenditure of the local government, subject to a budget 
constraint, which is just the sum of private expenditures plus his tax burden. Politicians 
are motivated to remain in ofBce and therefore make their expenditure and taxation 
decisions in such a way that results in a mix of expenditures and taxes that appeal to a 
dominant coalition of voters. Henderson (1968) uses a community welfare fimction rather 
than an individual's utility fimction. A community’s welfare is defined as a fimction of the 
community's per capita personal income, per capita aid received firom federal and state 
governments, population, per capita private and public expenditures. Politicians, as in Barr 
and Davis (1966), make expenditure and taxation decisions on behalf of the residents of 
the community. The resultant public expenditure and tax levels are the outcome of 
community welfare maximization subject to community budget constraints.
Wilde (1968) also uses consumer choice theory approach to analyzing expenditure 
effects of grants. A public utility fimction, with public goods and community resources as 
its arguments, is maximized by local decision makers subject to resources constraints. This 
public utility fimction in Wilde's model, however, is not a social welfare fimction or part
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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o f it, and he is vague in specifying whom or which groups the utility function actually 
represents. According to Wilde, local governments do not reflect perfectly the true 
preferences o f their citizens, owing to limitations o f representative democracy and the 
existence of inter-community spillover effects. The public utility function in his model 
therefore merely represents a set o f preferences for community goods and services that are 
consistent with standard indifference curves. Gramlich (1969a) specifically models state 
and local utility functions that are assumed to be maximized. His utility function includes 
the usual public and private good arguments, but also includes a built-in statutory 
constraint against borrowing. The state and local budgetary process is employed to derive 
structural equations for expenditures and revenues. Like Wilde, Gramlich is mute about 
whose utility that is being maximized. To get around the difficult and often unmanageable 
issues surrounding the social welfare function or the social indifference map, both Wilde 
and Gramlich simply assume the existence of it without further deliberations.
Imnan (1971. p. 701) similarly "characterizes the local government 
decision-making process by the optimization of a 'leadership preference function,' subject 
to a budget constraint." Inman's leadership preference function is fundamentally similar 
to Wilde’s and Gramlich's state and local government utility functions, but with more 
complicated public good variables as arguments. In addition to locally provided public 
goods, a variable representing gross additions to the local public capital stock, which 
captures the investment aspect o f local public investment decision, is also included in the 
preference function. Here Inman is explicit about whose utility that is being maximized.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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although the actual political and budgetary processes that form the basis o f the “leadership 
preference function” are intentionally left imdefîned in his model.
Inman (1979) argues that the fundamental iimovation of Barr and Davis (1966), 
Henderson (1968), Gramlich (1969a) and others like Wilde (1968) and Inman (1971) is 
their view of the process of state and local fiscal behavior as an "as if ' proposition: state 
and local expenditure and tax decisions are analyzed "as if ' they were the result o f utility 
maximization subject to a budget constraint. This constrained maximization approach 
represents a major improvement over the ad hoc approach of earlier determinants studies. 
Federal and state government policy variables can be systematically specified and 
empirically testable hypotheses regarding their effects on local budgetary choices can be 
derived and tested.
The constrained maximization approach of the 1960's served as an important 
stepping-stone to later studies of state and local government expenditures leading to the 
representative voter and median voter models of the 1970's. Variants of these constrained 
utility maximization models have since been used to study a variety o f public finance 
issues. For instance, Gordon (1983) employs constrained community welfare optimization 
technique to study issues of fiscal federalism, and Holsey (1993) uses the constrained 
utility maximization of the decisive voter to derive tax price and income illusions.
The constrained optimization approach, though providing a more coherent 
conceptual fimnework for studies of state and local government expenditures, is not 
without drawbacks. Inman (1971) and Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980) criticize the 
characterization of the political process as if  it were identical to individual decision-making
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
as naive and not directly testable. In addition, they contend that the heuristic assumption 
of the existence of a community utility function as if the Arrow impossibility theorem 
could be conveniently rejected for a group choice process is contrary to the tenants o f a 
positive analysis, and that the question of how individuals are aggregated to produce a 
community welfare function had not been resolved.
These arguments against the constrained maximization approach, though legitimate 
then, are, however, mitigated by later developments in the median voter approach and in 
the nonparametric test procedures based on the theory of revealed preference. These later 
developments will be discussed in turn in the following literature review and in Chapter
3.
2.4 Median Voter Models
The median voter approach postulates that in a direct or representative democracy 
with simple majority rule the level of public expenditures will correspond to the 
preferences of the median voter with median income. A median voter model based on this 
hypothesis represents a method of preference aggregation to derive public demand for local 
public goods and services. The median voter method addresses the political-budgetary 
question by providing a mechanism by which individual preferences are aggregated to 
community level.
Like the constrained maximization models, the median voter models also apply 
standard consumer choice theory to the public decision-making process. Unlike the 
constrained maximization models in which individuals as a group are making all the fiscal 
decisions in response to changes in income, tax prices and tastes, however, the median
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voter method introduces the political process into analysis. In this latter approach, local 
fiscal decisions are made by politicians who choose the mix of expenditure and tax 
decisions that reflect the preferences o f the median voter in order to attract a winning 
coalition of voters at election. In essence, therefore, the median voter models reduce the 
complexity o f the community utility function to the simplicity of the median voter's 
preferences if  the conditions o f simple majority rule within a democracy and 
single-peakedness o f voters' preferences hold [Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980); 
Inman (1979)].
The median voter models of state and local fiscal behavior have their tradition fi'oin 
the theory of spatial competition developed by Hotelling (1929), refined by Bowen (1943), 
Black (1948), and Downs (1957). Barr and Davis (1966) argue for the relevance of median 
position in election outcome, and use the median assessed value of taxable property as an 
explanatory variable in their empirical tests, even though the term of "median voter" is not 
explicitly used. Borcherding and Deacon (1972) are among the first to formally develop 
an empirical median voter model of local public spending. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas 
technology in the production of public goods, and by assuming a specific functional form 
o f the median voter's demand schedule for public goods and services, they derive a local 
public demand equation (in logarithmic form) expressed as a function o f wage rate, 
population and the median voter's income in the jurisdiction under consideration. 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) develop five conditions that are sufficient for local public 
expenditures to correspond to the preferences o f the median-income voter. These five 
conditions together require that income distribution in a jurisdiction is constant and
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proportional across jurisdictions, and that public goods and services are normal goods. 
These conditions in efifect assume the existence o f a homothetic utility function for all 
individuals in a jurisdiction. Bergstrom and Goodman do not derive their own public 
expenditure demand equation, but use, in their empirical study, a multiple regression 
equation similar to that derived by Borcherding and Deacon (1972). In addition to the now 
standard explanatory variables (that is, the population or number o f households, tax share 
o f the median-income voter, and the median voter's income) in the equation, they also 
include an array of several socio-economic variables pertinent to a particular community, 
including nonwhite as a percentage of population, population density, senior citizens as a 
percentage o f population, percentage change in population, the percentage of houses 
occupied by owners, the employment-residential ratio, etc.
Despite the innovative approach of median voter models to state and local public 
expenditures and taxation behavior, the usefulness and validity o f these models in 
describing and interpreting local public sector depend to a large extent on their empirical 
relevance. How well does the median voter model explain actual demand for public goods 
and services?
As cited above, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) specify an exact fimctional form 
(i.e. a CES-type log-linear form in marginal tax price and income) o f the median voter's 
demand schedule for public goods and services, and from which they derive a local public 
demand equation in logarithmic form as:
(1) In E = In A + a, In W*’ + a j In Y + In N
where A is the constant term, E the per capita expenditure on a particular public good, W
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the average wage rate, Y the median voter’s income and N the population in the 
jurisdiction under consideration. Note that a,’s are elasticities o f the respective variables 
and P is the labor’s share. Also note that the tax price elasticity, t], is embedded in their 
expenditure equation as t| = (a, - 1). In addition to the population variable in equation (1), 
population density and total land area of the jurisdiction are also included, somewhat 
arbitrarily, to form a number o f variants of equation (1). Their estimates o f equation (1) and 
its variants on various local public functions for forty-four states show that the median 
voter hypothesis is in general a useful working assumption.
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) use a variant of equation (1) as the following:
(2) In E = In A + a , In S + tt2  In Y + « 3  In N + Ej ppCj
where S is an explicit tax share term for the median voter that replaces the wage rate 
variable in equation (1), and X,’s are a number of descriptive socio-economic variables. 
They estimate the equation on various typical local services for 826 municipalities in ten 
states and conclude that their empirical results support the median voter hypothesis.
Equations (1) and (2) have since become the standard median voter models, with 
their various variants being used by numerous researchers. Inman (1978) uses equation (2) 
as a basis to conduct an empirical study on fifty-eight Long Island school districts and finds 
that the median voter hypothesis can be rejected by no more than a quarter of his sample 
districts, and that even in these districts the predictive bias of the model based on the 
median voter hypothesis never exceeds 20%.
McEachem (1978) employs the median voter hypothesis in specifying voters’ 
preference concerning local debt level under different collective decision rules in debt
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issues (i.e. simple majority vs. great-than-majority referendum or no referendum required, 
and provision of statutory debt limit vs. no debt limit, etc.) and uses an ad hoc linear 
function with per capita outstanding local debt as the endogenous variable. His empirical 
results from all fifty states support the hypothesis under either direct or representative 
democracy.
Pommerehne (1978), like Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), also applies the 
standard equation (2) to 110 Swiss municipahties and finds that the median voter approach 
to local public expenditures has a great explanatory power in general, especially for 
localities with referendum requirements. He concludes that for representative democracies 
with no provisions for referendum, the local bureaucracy’s influence on expenditure and 
tax issues may be so strong as to render the median voter hypothesis inoperative. It is 
worth noting that this particular point of Pommerehne’s conclusion is contrary to that of 
McEachem (1978), and will be used as part o f the conceptual foundation for this 
dissertation research.
Holcombe (1980) develops a firamework in which the median voter demand and 
constant marginal cost curves intersect to give rise to the equilibrium quantity and tax 
price. He uses the 1973 referenda data from 257 Michigan school districts to estimate the 
“Bowen” equilibrium (i.e. the outcome most preferred by the median voter) level of 
expenditures in each school district and compares these estimates with the actual level. His 
test results show that, on average, the actual level o f expenditures is less than 3% away 
from the estimated Bowen equilibrium, thus providing support for the median voter 
hypothesis.
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Gramiîch and Rubinfeld (1982) test, among other things, the median voter
hypothesis by utilizing the standard utility-maximization procedures to derive a typical
individual’s public spending demand function which, though more sophisticated, is both
conceptually and configuratively similarly to equations (1) and (2). Using the 1977 macro
data for the 83 counties in Michigan and the 1978 micro survey responses on demands for
public spending from 2001 households in Michigan to estimate the demand functions
separately, they find the median income approach provides a better fit than mean income
and therefore conclude that their empirical results support the hypothesis that the median
voter is decisive in setting spending levels.
Deno and Mehay (1987) employ the median voter fiamework to derive a variant
of equation (2) to determine whether or not expenditure behavior differs across
municipalities with different management structures (i.e. city manager vs. elected mayor-
council). Using data from 73 Michigan and Ohio cities, they find no statistically
significant differences between the two types o f governmental forms, thus supporting the
median voter hypothesis.
Although the above-cited studies all find empirical evidence to support the
hypothesis upon which the median voter model is based, Romer and Rosenthal (1979a,
1979b, 1982) fail to find supporting evidence. Romer and Rosenthal (1979a) review the
empirical results by leading median voter economists such as those cited above, but
conclude that (pp. 161-2, italics added):
“[t]he various studies we have reviewed have not provided strong, broadly 
based support for the median voter hypothesis. We found methodological 
problems that made tests of the hypothesis inherently difficult; and we 
found that the median voter models were inadequately tested against 
competing models. An implication of our finding is that,..., [political] 
institutions matter."
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Romer and Rosenthal (1979b, 1982) present a monopoly model in which they, like 
Niskanen (1971), assume that bureaucrats are budget maximizers and that bureaucrats have 
the power to control the agenda. Their “setter-reversion” bureaucratic model shows that 
when the reversion point is below the spending level most preferred by the median voter, 
the lower the reversion level, the higher the actual expenditure. Their empirical results 
from Oregon school district expenditure data in 1971 provide evidence for their 
bureaucratic model, but against the median voter outcome. A more detailed treatment of 
the Romer-Rosenthal model will be given in the next section in which the bureaucratic 
models will be reviewed.
Wyckoff (1988) also assumes budget-maximizing bureaucrats in his specification 
of the public spending demand equation, which, again, is some variant of equation (2) with 
additional explanatory variables like revenue-sharing aid received by the median voter, 
percentage o f population age 65 and over, and percentage of population that is nonwhite, 
etc. Using the 1977 Census data from 115 Michigan cities, he finds that current 
expenditures appear to be better explained by the median voter model, while the 
bureaucratic model has a greater explanatory power for capital expenditures. One possible 
explanation o f this discrepancy in the predictive power of different models could be that 
non-recurrent capital expenditures, unlike current expenditures that have to be approved 
annually, are subject to less scrutiny by voters/taxpayers, so that the bureaucrats have 
greater control over these types o f spending.
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994) apply the standard median voter specifications 
to their public expenditure demand equation and test the model on public spending data
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Êom 139 municipalities in five upper Midwestern states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio 
and Wisconsin). They find evidence to support the hypothesis on the aggregate level, but 
not on the individual separate fimctions of local governments.
Overall, as shown by the above review, the empirical evidence does appear to 
support the claim that the median voter is decisive.' And because o f its popularity, the 
median voter model itself has become the subject o f s t u d y A s  a practical matter, even 
when the median voter model is accepted as the appropriate theoretical model for 
aggregating individual preferences to the community level, other problems arise fi*om the 
wide variety o f empirical model specifications and conflicting interpretations of the 
parameter estimates. For example, Turnbull (1985) demonstrates that the estimated tax 
share elasticity derived firom one of the most popular version of the reduced form demand 
equation is not necessarily the same as the estimate o f the tax price elasticity in the 
structural model used in the empirical literature. Also, Turnbull (1995a) shows that the 
minor differences in demand equation specifications frequently leads to wide swings in tax 
price elasticity estimates. And, though conceptually clear, the actual identity of the median 
voter is ambiguous in empirical studies [Turnbull and Mitias (1995)].^
'For a concise summary of the median voter framework and its empirical relevance, see 
Turnbull (1995b, pp. 501).
%ee Holcombe (1989) for a review of the role of the median voter model in public choice 
theory.
^Turnbull and Mitias (1995) specifically address the question: Is the median voter the 
individual with median household income or with median family income? They show that 
key parameter estimates are sensitive to how the median voter is defined.
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On a more fundamental level, the median voter approach to local public spending 
is also burdened with some conceptual difGculties [Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980)]. 
As mentioned above, the condition o f single-peakedness o f voters' preferences is crucial 
to the validity of the "as if ' proposition of the median voter model. Even if this condition 
holds, there is another problem. If the issues to be voted on are multi-dimensional, vote- 
trading or logrolling may be present and as a consequence there may not be a unique voting 
equilibrium. Plott (1967), on the one hand, shows that in a  multi-dimensional issues setting 
it is possible to have a majority equilibrium if it is a maximum utility state for one, and 
only one, individual and the remaining individuals can be divided into pairs whose 
preferences are diametrically opposed in each direction in the issue space. Bemholz (1973, 
1974), on the other hand, shows that when voter preference intensities on each issue are 
not the same and when issues are decided in pairs, logrolling may arise, leading to cycling 
or intransitive group preferences. At any rate, if the voting equilibrium is not stable, the 
resultant expenditure and tax levels then would not correspond to the preferences of the 
median voter. Furthermore, as Romer and Rosenthal (1978,1979b, 1982) have shown, the 
equilibrium expenditure and taxation mix would depart from those derived from the 
median voter model if politicians have the power to set the agenda, as explained in the next 
section."
"Banks (1993) shows, however, that the ability of the agenda-setter to deviate from the 
median voter’s most preferred outcome is hampered by the same information asymmetries 
that give rise to the agenda-setter’s ability to affect the voting process in the first place. 
Contrast this with the results in Section 2.5.2.
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2.5 Bureaucratie Models
2.5.1 The Niskanen Mode!
Instead of modeling local government budgetary process using standard consumer
choice theory from the demand side, bureaucratic models assume budget maximization by
bureaucrats. The most well known economic model of bureaucracy is the one developed
by Niskanen, who suggests that his 1971 book on "Bureaucracy and Representative
Government" be alternatively titled "The Supply of Public Services" [Niskanen, (1971),
p. 9], from which we can infer that emphasis is placed on the supply of, rather than the
demand for, public goods and services. The bureaucratic approach or the
budget-maximization approach to modeling local public sector behavior is based on two
critical characteristics o f bureaus: (1) Bureaucrats maximize the total budget of their
bureaus, given demand and cost conditions, subject to the constraint that the budget must
be equal to or greater than the minimum total costs of supplying the output expected by the
bureau's sponsor, and (2) Bureaus exchange a specific output for a specific budget
[Niskanen, (1968,1971, 1975)]. The second characteristic distinguishes a bureau from a
firm in the marketplace. To quote Niskanen (1971, p. 25, italics original):
"A bureau offers a promised set o f  activities and the expected output(s) o f  
these activities fo r  a budget. The primary difference between the exchange 
relation of a bureau and that o f a market organization is that a bureau offers 
a total output in exchange for a budget, whereas a market organization 
offers units of output at a price."
Oates (1979), in his examination of the price effects of intergovernmental grants, 
presents a somewhat different characterization of a bureau. Oates’ bureaucratic model 
postulates that bureaucrats are output maximizers who set output at the highest level
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consistent with that most preferred by the median voter in exchange o f voters’ tax-price 
that is necessary to provide the proposed level of public output. If the proposed budget is 
rejected, then the budget is reversed back to a reduced level o f  expenditure. The presence 
of intergovernmental grants allows the local bureaucracy to provide a given level o f output 
at a lower tax-price, not the true cost, to the voters. Note that Oates’s characterization of 
the budgetary process is analogous to those of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979b, 1982).
In Niskanen’s bureaucratic model, the implication o f this characteristic o f a bureau 
is that the "all-or-nothing" choice gives a bureau the same type of market power as a price 
discriminating monopoly. On the other hand, the bureau's sponsor (the budget-reviewing 
committee) usually depends on the bureau for the supply o f a specific service. Lack of a 
significant alternative and its unwillingness to forego the services supplied by the bureau 
make the sponsor a passive player in this bureau-sponsor relationship. Furthermore, a 
bureaucrat will know, through past budget-output experience, relatively more about the 
factor costs and production processes for the bureau's services than will the ofiBcers of the 
sponsoring organization. A bureaucrat also has a stronger incentive to obtain information 
relevant to his position. These relative incentives and available information give the 
bureau the overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power.
According to Niskanen's formulation, a bureaucrat's utility is a fimction of salary, 
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output o f the bureau, ease of 
managing the bureau, and ease o f making exchanges. Since all o f these variables are a 
positive monotonie function of the total budget of the bureau, budget maximization is 
therefore an adequate proxy for maximization of a bureaucrat's utility.
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With the assumptions o f a passive sponsor and a dominant monopoly bureau, 
Niskanen Annulâtes the basic system of his bureaucratic model as follows; there is a cost- 
output function represented by:
(3) TC = cQ + d Q \ O ^Q  
and there is a budget-output function as:
(4) B = a Q - b Q \  0 ^ Q < a / 2 b
where
TC = minimum total cost to a bureau;
B = total potential budget o f a bureau; and 
Q = output o f a bureau.
The constraint is that the budget must be equal to or greater than the minimum total cost 
such that:
(5) B ^ TC
The first derivative o f equation (3) and (4) yields, respectively:
(6) C = c + 2dQ
(7) V = a -2 b Q  
where
C = minimum marginal cost to a bureau; and 
V = marginal valuation function (demand function).
The equilibrium level of output, Q, can be determined from the above system of equations. 
Budget maximization of B leads to Q = a/2b, which is the upper bound of the output level. 
The constraint that budget must be at least equal to total minimum cost leads to
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Q = (a-c)/(b+d), is the lower bound of the output level derived by equating equation
(3) to equation (4). These two levels of Q are equal at where a = 2bc/(b-d). The Pareto- 
optimal level of output, however, is at where Q = (a-c)/2(b+d), which can be derived by 
equating equation (6) to equation (7). Comparison of the output levels shows that the 
equilibrium output under a monopoly bureau is exactly twice as large as that under 
competitive conditions.
Figure 1 reproduces Niskanen's original diagram illustrating the above equilibrium 
levels of output of a monopoly bureau [Niskanen, (1971), p. 47]. For the lower demand 
condition represented by V„ the equilibrium output is indicated by a level marked as (a,- 
c)/(b+d) on the Q-axis. At that level o f output, total budget is represented by the area 
ea,gh, which is equal to the total cost area ecfli. The Pareto-optimal level o f output will 
be at where the marginal cost function, C, intersects the marginal valuation function, V,. 
From the diagram, it is clear that the equilibrium level of output is higher than the Pareto- 
optimal level. At the equilibrium level of output, the marginal cost Jh is higher than the 
marginal value to the sponsor gh. With the higher demand condition represented by Vj, 
the equilibrium output will be even higher, at where the marginal value of output is zero, 
whereas the marginal minimum cost is ij.
Niskanen's bureaucratic model, given its assumptions about the bureau and the 
sponsor, produces a large set o f hypotheses concerning the level o f bureau budgets, 
bureaus' production efficiency, the level of output of bureaus' services, etc. Specifically, 
five hypotheses stand out: (1) The Overspending Hypothesis: government budgets are 
larger than what is preferred by the median legislator, and in a representative government.




Figure 1. Equilibrium Output of a Bureau
Source: Reproduced from William A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971, 
p. 47, Figure 5.1.
larger than what is preferred by the median voter. And the larger is the monopoly power 
o f the government and the bureaus supplying the government services, the larger will be 
the amount o f overspending; (2) Production Inefficiency Hypothesis: overspending by 
bureaus may take the form of inefficiency in producing a given set o f outputs and/or a 
higher level o f some output. The relative magnitude of inefficiency and higher output 
depends on the bureaucrat's preferences, the reward structures, and the characteristics of
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the budget-reviewing process; (3) The Oversupply Hypothesis: a bureau will supply 
more o f some output valued by the legislature than would be approved by the whole 
legislature if monitoring were costless; (4) The Overcapitalization Hypothesis: a bureau 
will use more coital-intensive production technology than would a private firm producing 
the same service; and (5) The Bureaucratic Structure Hypothesis: the consolidation o f 
bureaus supplying competitive services would increase the monopoly power o f the 
remaining bureaus, by increasing the costs to Congress of identifying the actual and 
potential costs of a service and by changing the incentives of bureaucrats firom competing 
on an efficiency basis to promoting the total demand for the service [Niskanen, (1975)].
Perhaps the single most important conclusion firom Niskanen's analysis is that 
budget size in a representative democracy generally tends to be too large and the level o f 
public services too excessive, as compared with the outcome implied in the median voter 
models [Holcombe (1989)]. This conclusion contributed to the ongoing debate on the 
"proper" size of the public sector, which is at the core of the Leviathan hypothesis.® 
Borcherding (1977) is in general in agreement with Niskanen's analysis, and cites other 
studies that seem to substantiate Niskanen's various hypotheses. Staaf (1977a, 1977b) 
presents empirical evidence that support Niskanen's premise that a bureaucrat's salary, 
power, prestige and the size of the bureau's budget are positively related. Orzechowski 
(1977) in his empirical study of public colleges and universities finds evidence that support
®See Brennan (1981) and Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) for detailed 
discussions of the Leviathan hypothesis. While Oates (1985, 1989) and Forbes and 
Zampelli (1989) do not find empirical support for the hypothesis, Zax (1989) finds 
evidence supporting the Leviathan view.
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Niskanen's Production InefiBciency hypothesis. In his review of Niskanen's work, Tullock 
(1972, 1974) extends the model to strengthen his own theoretical explanation for the 
growth of bureaucracy over time. Specifically, he rejects Niskanen's view that public 
services are superior goods and argues instead that the gradual expansion of bureaucracy 
is because civil servants have an incentive to vote for those congressmen who are interested 
in expanding bureaus. Once the Congress expands the bureaucracy in one period, there 
will be more bureaucrats, and hence their political weight in the next period.
Disagreement with Niskanen's analysis also generates several critical reviews. For 
example, in a review of Niskanen's 1971 book, Thompson (1973) questions Niskanen's 
assumption o f a  passive sponsor and dominant bureau. He argues that in the real world it 
is the trustees, e.g. the budget-reviewing committee, not the bureaucrats, that actually 
decide on the final budget of the bureaus. The trustees are in a superior bargaining position 
because they can replace the bureaucrat if he refiises to produce their desired level of 
output at their preferred price. The budget size in this context will depends on how 
successful the bureaucrat is in misrepresenting actual expected costs and output. But 
misrepresentation will normally not work because any striving underling who knows what 
is going on could raise his wage by informing the trustees of the true costs or promising to 
deliver lower outputs at the true costs. Since under these conditions the bureau's customer 
is a monopsonist, the bureau may underproduce rather than overproduce.
Margolis (1975) expresses his skepticism about the fruitfulness o f Niskanen's 
methodology o f a bilateral monopoly model, arguing that the division of government into 
just two groups is inappropriate. The division must at least contain the minimum set of
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institutions such as: the executive, the legislature, the administration, the bureaucracy, and
organizations o f the citizenry such as parties and lobbies. Therefore the budget
maximization hypothesis and the premise of utility-maximizing bureaucrats are seriously
questioned. Margolis further argues that government is involved in the much more
complex problems of social stability, nation building, etc. that affect its behavior and the
form of its institutions. Thus consumers' satisfaction alone is not a sufticient objective to
explain the behavior o f government.
Breton and Wintrobe (1975), like Thompson (1973), also question Niskanen's
assumption of a passive sponsor and dominant bureau. But unlike Thompson, they
emphasize the disparity o f information available to the sponsor. The bureau's "control"
over its sponsor does not stem from its dominant position as a monopoly supplier of a
given service, but rather from its control of information. They also elaborate on the
sponsor's control processes to derive a conclusion that modifies that from Niskanen's
model. Recall that one o f the major conclusions o f the Niskanen model is the oversupply
hypothesis as the source ofinefSciency in bureaucratic supply. Breton and Wintrobe argue
that it is costlier for the sponsor to monitor X-inefGciency than to monitor oversupply, so
the major source of inefficiency in bureaucratic supply is X-inefficiency rather than
oversupply of output. Finally, also like Thompson (1975), Breton and Wintrobe (1975, p.
204) question the logic o f budget maximization, arguing that:
"..mobility among bureaus in governmental organization is large, and that 
heads of bureaus often improve their salaries and other amenities of office 
by moving from a position at the head of a relatively large bureau to one at 
the head o f a smaller one, this would seem to indicate that a different 
objective fimction is being maximized."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
31
Musgrave (1981), in his discussion of the Leviathan hypothesis, also raises 
objections to the assumption of budget maximization as being too simplistic to realistically 
describe the complexities o f human motivation.
Despite the criticism, Niskanen's most significant contribution is in providing a 
systematic supply-side fiamework of bureaucratic behavior [Holcombe, (1989), pp. 116-7]. 
A number of extensions are made by others to examine the consequences o f situations 
where bureaucrats are able to determine the agenda of issues on which voters are permitted 
to vote [see, for example, Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979b, 1982); Denzau, Mackay and 
Weaver (1979); Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982); Ott (1980); and Wyckoff (1988)].* 
The next sub-section reviews Romer and Rosenthal’s bureaucratic model.
2.5.2 The Romer-Rosenthal Model
The setter-reversion , or agenda-control, model of Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 
1979b, 1982), which has already been noted earlier, is of particular interest here in the 
context o f Niskanen’s monopoly supply model. Their model extends Niskanen’s notion 
of bureaucratic behaviors to the median voter model fiamework, and in the end 
significantly modifies the expenditure outcome predicted by the latter model.
In their monopoly model, bureaucrats are posited to have the power to control the 
agenda. Under full information, the bureaucrats’ monopoly power is derived firom lack of 
“competitive” substitutes to the proposed public services. Under imperfect information and 
uncertainty, voters do not have adequate information about the true cost o f publicly 
provided services or about the fall-back or reversion expenditure and therefore the
*Mackay and Weaver (1978) offer a detailed review of this line o f literature.
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bureaucrats can exercise agenda control. Like Niskanen (1971), Romer and Rosenthal also 
characterize bureaucrats as budget or expenditure maximizers. Because the agenda setter 
has monopoly power over the proposed budget to be put before the electorate, voters are 
forced to choose between the agenda-setter’s proposed budget or some reduced level. That 
is, if the proposed budget is not accepted by voters, it will automatically be reversed back 
to a pre-specified level. The reversion level is determined legally or exogenously. How it 
is set is, however, not important to the analysis. What is interesting is their demonstration 
o f the mechanism through which the actual public expenditure level depends on the 
reversion point or the status quo. They show that when the reversion point is below the 
spending level most preferred by the median voter, the lower the reversion level, the higher 
the actual expenditure.
To illustrate the agenda-control model, consider Figure 2 in which the median 
voter’s preferences over the private and public goods are represented by the indifference 
curves U/s. Expenditures on public goods are measured on the horizontal axis labeled as 
G, and private consumption is represented by the vertical axis X. The line MM represents 
the budget constraint facing the median voter.’ The median voter’s most preferred level 
o f public expenditures would be the one that maximizes his utility given this budget 
constraint As shown in the diagram, is the equilibrium level o f public sector spending 
that maximizes the median voter’s utility, at U'.
’For simplicity, all forms o f intergovernmental aid are assumed to be non-existent so that 
they do not enter the voter’s budget set. The omission of this variable would not affect the 
analysis in any significant way.














MM: The median voter’s budget constraint;
Indifiference curves;
Reversion levels;
The median voter’s most preferred public sector expenditures; 
The maximum budget the setter can propose, given R°.
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If the spending authority, or the agenda-setter, has the monopoly power to control 
the agenda, he could propose a budget for public services that deviates from the most 
preferred state of the median voter. Voters are confronted with a “take-it-or-leave-it” 
binary choice. If the reversion or fall-back position, say R°, is such that R“ < the 
median voter’s utility level would be lowered, to U°, if the proposed budget is voted down 
by voters. Since the median voter is indifferent between R“ and G*, he and all o f the 
above-median voters would vote for any proposed budget between R° and G*. If the only 
alternative to the proposed budget is the reversion level R° and if the setter has complete 
information about the median voter’s preferences, the maximum budget the agenda-setter 
can propose is G*.
According the median voter hypothesis already reviewed in the previous section, 
the level o f public expenditures most preferred by the median voter, G^ in the diagram, 
would be the level actually chosen by voters under a simple majority rule. The Romer- 
Rosenthal agenda-control model, however, shows a totally different outcome. Any 
proposed budget level between G“ and G*, such as R ‘, that is greater than G t^would 
actually be chosen by voters, since the median and the above-median voters would be 
better off with this greater-than-median public sector budget.
If the reversion level of public expenditures, say R', is such that R' > G“ , then the 
agenda-setter needs only propose a budget greater than R' to ensure that the reversion level 
will win in the election. The result again is that the actual public sector budget accepted 
will be greater than the median voter’s most preferred choice. Only when the reversion
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level is exactly equal to the median voter’s most preferred state would the median voter’s 
preferences be realized.
It is clear from the agenda-setter model that the actual level o f public sector 
expenditures depends on the reversion or fall-back position. The lower the reversion level 
is, the higher would be the budget accepted by voters. Obviously, the best situation, from 
the bureaucrats’ perspective, is Niskanen’s “all-or-nothing” choice where the reversion 
level is zero. An example would be voters’ choice between a fire department budget that 
is considered excessive and no fire department at all. When the budget is subject to 
reversion, how the voters would choose is therefore intuitively clear. The key here is the 
availability of viable alternatives.
2.53 Comparison of the Romer-Rosenthal Model with the Niskanen Model
What parallels Romer and Rosenthal’s (1978, 1979b, 1982) setter-reversion model 
with the bureaucratic model o f Niskanen is in their characterization of bureaucratic 
behaviors and in their implied outcome concerning the equilibrium level of public 
expenditures. Both describe the same type of asymmetric information possessed by 
bureaucrats and their constituents. Both predict an expenditure outcome that deviates from 
the median voter result. In particular, both models lead to the same conclusion about the 
output expansion effect in the public sector. Another common feature o f these two models 
is that, although both characterize bureaucrats as budget-maximizers, neither is definitive 
about the underlying utility fimction for the bureaucrats. This lack o f explicit treatment of 
bureaucratic utility functions, vèich is common to most bureaucratic models, has important 
implications as to the usefulness of these models, as discussed further below.
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Aside from the similarities o f these two models, there are fundamental differences 
as well. First, Niskanen’s bureaucratic model emphasizes the supply side aspect o f the 
publicly provided goods and services, while the Romer-Rosenthal model extends the 
standard median voter model by introducing into the analysis the interactions between 
monopolistic bureaucrats and hapless voters. Second, whereas Niskanen’s monopoly 
model leads to an “all-or-nothing” binary choice facing the budget-reviewing committee, 
Romer and Rosenthal’s model leads to a “take-it-or-leave-it” binary choice facing voters. 
In fact, Niskanen’s “all-or-nothing” choice can be viewed as a special case o f the Romer- 
Rosenthal model in which the reversion level is zero expenditure. Third, the bureaucrats’ 
monopoly power in Niskanen’s model comes from the “all-or-nothing” choice and lack of 
significant alternatives, while in Romer and Rosenthal’s model the source of monopoly 
power is derived either from lack of competitive substitutes (under certainty) or from 
voters’ insufficient information (under uncertainty) concerning the fall-back or reversion 
expenditures. Finally, the political-budgetary processes described in the models are 
different. The Niskanen model is formulated in the Congressional legislative context, 
while the Romer-Rosenthal model is formulated under direct democracy and referenda 
situations.
2.6 Relevance of the Bureaucratic Models to This Study
In this chapter, models of state and local government fiscal behavior are reviewed. 
The public choice approach, especially Niskanen's bureaucratic model, is of particular 
relevance to this dissertation research. As noted earlier, Pommerehne (1978, pp. 270-7) 
contends that the median voter approach is inadequate for representative democracies with
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no provisions for referendum. The influence of bureaucracy, central or local, and interest 
groups on public expenditures may be so strong that other politico-economic models rather 
than the median voter approach are needed to adequately model equilibrium outcomes.
As noted in the introduction chapter in this dissertation, the political culture, 
tradition and system in Taiwan are different from those of the western democracies. For 
a country such as Taiwan, where the opposition parties to the ruling Koumintang (KMT) 
party did not exist technically prior to 1989, the political-budgetary process o f which is 
certainly different from that of the United States. Since in Taiwan the collective choice 
mechanism has long been dominated by a single party, unqualified applications of 
voter/taxpayer choice theory-based models, which assume that local public sector 
expenditures reflect the preferences of the median voter, are clearly not suitable for studies 
of Taiwan’s local fiscal behavior; a bureaucratic approach along the line o f Niskanen’s 
model may therefore be more appropriate to serve as the theoretical fiamework upon which 
this dissertation is based.
Although the bureaucratic models of Niskanen and Romer and Rosenthal provide 
an alternative fiamework for studies of local fiscal behavior under different institutional 
settings, neither approach explicitly address the question: Regardless how the public sector 
budget is determined, what do bureaucrats do with it once the budget is approved? Do they 
spend the money in a systematic fashion? Can the observed public expenditure data be 
viewed as the constrained optimization outcome? Although he alluded to this kind of 
question in his treatment of budget-maximizing bureaucrats, Niskanen (1968, 1971,1975) 
only implies that budget maximization is an adequate proxy for maximization of a
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bureaucrat's utility. Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979b, 1982) never even ask the 
question.
Also as indicated earlier, Taiwan's local governments have to depend on 
intergovernmental grants and aids to meet their annual budgets. Given the central 
government’s prominent role in the local public spending process and given the important 
role of local bureaucracy in extracting spending budgets from the central authority, to what 
extent does the behavior o f the local public bureaucracy and politicians reflect that o f a 
utility-maximizing bureaucrat? Or to what extent does local bureaucracy’s spending 
pattern reflect that o f a utility-maximizing central government? Regardless how the 
question is posed, the central issue is whether or not one can view the local public sector 
expenditures in Taiwan as constrained optimization outcomes. This is a question answered 
by neither Niskanen, nor Romer and Rosenthal, nor others.
The task of this study is, therefore, to empirically test the “as i f ’ proposition central 
to public sector economics. To perform this task, a bureaucratic model along Niskanen’s 
notion of budget-maximizing bureaucrats is implicitly assumed in this dissertation. The 
bureaucrats are also assumed to maximize their utility subject to the public sector budget 
constraint Using local public sector spending and employment data drawn from Taiwan, 
the assumption of utility maximization is then tested empirically. The following chapter 
describes the test procedures.




Under the implicit framework of a bureaucratic model in which bureaucrats 
maximize their utility subject to a public sector budget constraint, the task of this 
dissertation research is to find an appropriate statistical procedure to empirically test 
whether the assumption o f constrained optimization holds.
There are two approaches to test whether or not the observed data set conforms to 
the assumption of utility maximization in the literature. The most frequently used approach 
is to assume either a specific functional form of the underlying utility (preference) relations 
among a set of economic and socio-economic variables from which the demand curves are 
derived, or a specific functional form for the demand curves directly with an implicit 
assumption about the underlying utility (preference). Parameters such as price and income 
elasticities are then estimated empirically and evaluated for their consistency with the 
known theoretical properties from consumer choice theory. For example, Barr and Davis 
(1966), Henderson (1968), Wilde (1968), Gramlich (1969a), and Inman (1971) all proceed 
from the constrained utility maximization framework to derive the demand equations, 
whereas Ohls and Wales (1972), Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973), Deacon (1978), and other researchers working on the median voter 
models assume a set o f  demand functions which they then estimate.
The alternative approach uses the nonparametric revealed preference theory to test 
the data, and does not assume a specific functional form of either the utility function or the
39
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demand functions. As the term "nonparametric" implies, no estimation of parameters are 
involved in this test procedure. What follows is a more detailed description o f these two 
alternative approaches to testing utility-maximization with a given set of observed data.
3.1.1 Parametric Tests
To apply the neoclassical consumer choice theory to public sector decision-making, 
it is necessary to specify a variety o f functional forms of utility and/or demand functions 
to derive the estimating equations. The functional form so specified can be any of the 
following: the standard Cobb-Douglass utility function, the constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function, the Stone-Geary Homothetic utility function, the 
addilog utility function, the translog utility function, the Rotterdam model o f systems of 
demand equations, or the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) [see, for example, Theil 
(1980, chapters 2 and 13); Deaton and Muellbauer (1980); and Silberberg (1990, pp. 405- 
411)].
The choice of functional form for the utility function determines the set of 
restrictions on the structure of the underlying utility (preference) as well as the resultant 
behavior functions. For example, it is well-known that the demand equations derived from 
neoclassical utility maximization subject to a budget constraint must satisfy the following 
three properties:
(a) negativity of the Hicksian own price effect;
(b) symmetry of the Hicksian cross-price effects; and
(c) The resultant Mashallian demand function is homogeneous of degree zero in 
income and prices.
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What follows is a demonstration o f the actual parametric test procedure used for 
this dissertation research. The translog utility function as developed in Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau (1975) is known for its flexibility. For the purpose of this research, it 
is chosen for the parametric tests of utility maximization hypothesis. The objective then is 
to:
(8) Max InUf = InX^  + Î4 InXj
Subject to Ej PjXj = M, i,j = 1,2,. . . ,  m 
Where U is the utility o f local (or central) bureaucracy, M the total local public budget, Xj 
the output or service level o f the local public function, Pj the price of the public good, 
and m the number of local public goods and services. The budget or expenditure share for 
each category of public services can be derived from the above constrained maximization 
problem, and is expressed as following:
(9) = =' " %
M Ejtt^ + EjEjjP .^ InXj
where Pÿ are parameters o f the cross-partial derivatives and E^ = -1, k = 1,2,..., m.
The budget share equations must satisfy the three properties of a well-behaved 
demand function derived from a constrained utility maximization problem. In empirical 
testing of the utility maximization hypothesis, these properties translate into the following 
two restrictions [Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975), p. 371]:
(a) Symmetry: Py = pj;, i*j, Lj = l , 2 , ...,m;and
(b) Equality: E^ P^ (appearing in the denominator) must be the same for 
each budget share equation.
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To perform the estimation procedures, two additional assumptions are needed: (a) 
stochastic specification of the theoretical models of the budget share equations is assumed, 
so that disturbances from i = 1,2,..., m of the budget share equations sum to zero. Given 
the disturbances in any (m - 1) equations, the disturbance of the remaining equation can be 
determined. Thus only (m -1 ) estimating equations are required; and (b) disturbances are 
assumed to be independent of the X,'s.
The total number o f parameters to be estimated for the econometric demand 
equations without the restrictions is [5 + (m - 2)*2]*(m -1). For the restricted model, there 
will be (‘/ 2 )*m*(m -1 ) symmetry restrictions, and m*(m - 2) equality restrictions. If there 
are only three categories o f public services under study (i.e. m = 3), the whole system of 
demand equations will comprise o f three budget share or expenditure equations, and we 
only have to estimate any two, such as the following:
P j Oj + pii InX^  + Pi2 IrtX^  + Pi3 /«Afj
(10)
(11)
M  ( -1 + Pty InX  ^ + Ptz InXj^  + P« InX^ )
^ «2 + P2 I + P2 2  + P2 3  ”^^3
M  ( -1 + Pw InX  ^ + Pi2 Inx^ + P« InX^ )
Where Ppc, = total public expenditure in service category /, / =1,2;
Xj = output or service level in service category /, / = 1,2,3;
P k i = P i i  +  P 2 i +  p 3 i ;
Pk2 ~  P12 P22 P32»
Pk3 =  P l 3 +  P23 +  P33;
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Note that for the unrestricted form (i.e. no assumption is made about utility 
maximization), the denominators in equations (10) and (11) will have to be estimated 
separately. For the restricted form (i.e. when the utility maximization restrictions are 
imposed), only one set of the denominator needs be estimated. The hypothesis testing 
procedure is as follows: The maintained hypothesis is that the restricted form is not 
statistically different from the umestricted form. To test this hypothesis, a likelihood ratio 
test procedure as described in Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975, pp. 378-9) or in 
Judge, Hill, GrifiBths, Liitkephol and Lee (1988, p. 105) can be performed to determine 
whether or not the hypothesis o f utility maximization can be rejected at a certain pre­
determined significance level. Specifically, the likelihood ratio X is:
(12) A = /(o))//(Q)
where /(w) is the maximum value o f the likelihood function for the restricted model, and 
1(0.) the maximum value of the likelihood function for the unrestricted model. The test 
statistic LR is:
(13) LR = 2 [ I ( e * ) - I ( 0 o ) ]
where L(Q*) is the maximum likelihood estimator of the unrestricted log-likelihood 
function, and L(Qq) the maximum likelihood estimator of the restricted log-likelihood 
function. Under the maintained hypothesis, LR is asymptotically distributed as a 
random variable with degrees o f freedom equal to the number o f restrictions (i.e. the 
number of maintained hypotheses) to be tested. Once the models are estimated, LR can be 
calculated and compared with the critical value to determine if  the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the assumption of utility 
maximization holds.
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For separability under utility maximization, the following restrictions (for a system 
of three equations) can be separately imposed:
(a) Pij/a, = ^ 2 3 / ^ 2  (separability of X, and X; from Xj); or
(b) Pij/a, = Pjz/O] (separability of X, and Xj from X2 ); or
(c) Pz/O; = P s/a j (separability ofX; and Xj from X,).
A similar likelihood ratio test can be performed for each of these separability 
restrictions to deteimine whether of not the maintained specific separability hypothesis can 
be rejected. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the assumption of separability 
holds for the specific group of service categories from other service category. For 
example, if the test results show that restriction (a) cannot be rejected while restrictions (b) 
and (c) are rejected at the pre-specified significance level, then we can conclude that public 
services X, and X% a sa  group is separable from public service X y
3.1.2 Nonparametric Tests
Instead of testing whether or not the observed public sector expenditure data 
conforms to the particular fimctional form of the bureaucracy’s utility function, a 
nonparametric approach simply tests whether or not the observed data is consistent with 
the axioms of revealed preferences. In this approach, no parameters need be estimated, nor 
is it necessary to assume a priori a particular fimctional form of the utility function. This 
nonparametric test procedure is based on the theoretical concepts first developed by 
Samuelson (1938) and Houthakkar (1950) and later made empirically operational by Afiiat 
(1967,1976) and Varian (1982, 1983,1985).
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The weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) states that a bundle o f goods X' 
is revealed preferred to a bundle o f goods X  if  given the price vector ? ' and total 
expenditures P 'X , the goods bundle X is purchased when the goods bundle X  is also 
available. The goods bundle X  could have been chosen, but was not, at prices P , it then 
must be inferior to goods bundle X" and will never be revealed preferred to X . Thus 
WARP can be written in mathematical form as:
(14) If P 'X  i  P'X, then P% "<P X
In the context of this dissertation research, P X = E^' p '^ x '^ (k = 1, ..., m, the 
number of public goods and services) represents total local public expenditures on all 
publicly provided goods and services by jurisdiction / in the cross-section data set, or for 
year i by a jurisdiction in the time-series data set. P 'X  = p '^ represents total public
expenditures for jurisdiction j  evaluated at jurisdiction i ’s prices in cross-section analysis, 
or for yearj  at year Vs prices in time-series analysis.
The strong axiom of revealed preference (SARP) states that if given the price vector 
P' and total expenditure PX, the goods bundle X  is revealed preferred to the goods bundle 
X, and given the price vector P^  and total expenditure P X , the goods bundle X  is revealed 
preferred to X‘, then the goods bundle X  is revealed preferred to the goods bundle X*' 
through transitivity, and the goods bundle X  ^cannot be also revealed preferred to the goods 
bundle X . In mathematical terms, SARP can be expressed as:
(15) If P 'X '  ^ P 'X \ P^X  ^ k P^X\ ..., P'^-'X''-' k P'^  'X'', 
then X 'R X \ and P 'X ''< P'X '
where “R” describes the transitive relationship.
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SARP implies Varian's (1982) Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), 
which states that if  X' is revealed preferred to X*' through transitivity, then X^ caimot be 
directly strictly revealed preferred to X*. A goods bundle X^ is defined as directly strictly 
revealed preferred to X" if  P'%'^ > Therefore GARP can be expressed as:
(16) If P 'X ' k P 'X \ P"X" ^ P^X\ ..., P'^ -'X'^ -' k P'^ -'X'^
then X 'R X \  and P'%" ^ P'X '
Note that WARP is a necessary, but not sufBcient, condition for the data set to be 
consistent with SARP or GARP, and that SARP requires the demand relations to be single­
valued while GARP is compatible with multi-valued solutions, so that although SARP 
implies GARP, the reverse is not true. That is, GARP allows for flat areas on the 
indifference curves in standard consumer theory. The transitivity relations described above 
is what is called by Varian as the "transitive closure" in GARP.
Figure 3 is used to illustrate the relations among WARP, SARP and GARP. As 
shown in Panel A of the diagram, the goods bundle X lies inside the budget line 
represented by P 'X ', and X \ though inside the budget line represented by P X \ is outside 
the budget line P 'X '. What the diagram means is that at prices P ' the goods bundle X' is 
chosen, indicating that X  ^could have been purchased, but was not, at prices P ', therefore 
X' is revealed preferred to X \ At prices P ', goods bundle X  ^is more expensive than goods 
bundle X', indicating that it is not available at P '. Therefore X' and X  ^are not comparable 
by direct comparison. The goods bundle X  ^ is chosen at prices P  ^ when X  ^ is also 
available, therefore X  ^is revealed preferred to X \ The paired bundles (X', X^) and (X ,^ 
X )^ are consistent with WARP.







Figure 3. The W eak, Strong and Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference
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A comparison of goods bundles X*’ and X ,^ however, shows a violation o f  WARP. 
At prices P \ the goods bundle X'' could have been chosen, but was not. Therefore X  ^is 
revealed preferred to goods bundle X' . At prices P‘, however, the goods bundle X'' is also 
revealed preferred to the goods bundle X .^ This clearly violates WARP.
Although X* and X^  are not comparable by WARP as in Panel A, since X' is 
revealed preferred to X ,^ and X to X ,^ then X' is revealed preferred to X^  through the 
transitive closure. Note that the implied relationship P^X  ^^ P X' is fulfilled. The paired 
bundle (X‘, X )^ is therefore consistent with both SARP and GARP. By the same token, in 
Panel B of the diagram, the paired bundles (X‘, X^), (X‘, X^), and (X\ X )^ are all consistent 
with WARP, and (X’, X )^ is also consistent with both SARP and GARP.
If a data set satisfies GARP, then, according to Afiiat's Theorem (1967, 1976), 
"there exists a nonsatiated, continuous, concave, monotonie utility function that 
rationalizes the data" [Varian (1982), p. 946, Italics original]. Therefore, it is possible to 
work backward to demonstrate the existence of a well-behaved (i.e. quasi-concave) utility 
function fi-om a data set that does not violate GARP, which in turn guarantees the 
simultaneous satisfaction of the three properties of a demand function [Silberberg (1990), 
p. 381].
As described by DeBoer (1986), there are two possible types of GARP violations. 
The first is a "direct" violation that occurs when a goods bundle X' is revealed preferred 
or indifierent to another goods bundle X", but X* is also revealed preferred to X'. This type 
of violation is in essence a violation of WARP described above. A second type of violation 
is the "transitive" violation, which occurs when X' is revealed preferred to X" through the
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transitive closure, but X* is also revealed preferred to X through direct comparison. "If 
GARP is satisfied, the data may be characterized as the result of constrained utility 
maximization. If the data set contains a violation o f GARP, it cannot be described as the 
result of constrained maximization." [DeBoer (1986), p. 90]
In order to ascertain whether or not the local public bureacrats have well-behaved 
preferences defined over the public sector budget, the nonparametric test techniques 
according to the concept of GARP can be carried out to check the consistency condition 
of the oberserved data set. In the first stage of the procedures, the task is to calculate P'X’ 
and P'X* across all jurisdictions i and j  in any given year in the cross-section analysis, or 
for all years i and j  in any given jurisdiction in the time-series analysis. In the second 
stage, these total public expenditure results will be compared pairwise with all other cross­
price expenditure results to check if there exist any violations o f WARP. In the final step, 
a pairwise comparison through the transitive closure will be performed to check whether 
GARP is violated. Failure to find GARP violations would imply that the public 
expenditure data from Taiwan can be viewed as constrained optimization outcome. In 
other words, if  the data satisfy GARP, then the local (or central) bureaucracies have well- 
defined bureaucratic utility functions and they behave “as i f ’ they maximize public 
spending.
3 .U  Comparison of Parametric and Nonparametric Tests
As made clear by the above description of these two alternative test approaches, the 
nonparametric approach appears superior to the parametric procedure.
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As DeBoer (1986, p. 89) puts it, rejection of utility maximization, using a particular 
functional form, may mean either one of two possibilities: (1) the data set caimot be 
rationalized by constrained maximization; or (2) the data set can be rationalized by 
constrained maximization, but not by the chosen parametric form of the utility or demand 
function. The second possibility is perhaps the most likely cause for rejection of utility 
maximization, and hence consumer choice theory, because the parametric test results are 
conditional on the functional form's being correct. Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975) 
reject demand theory using direct and indirect translog utility functions. Deaton (1986), 
however, contends that functional form is not likely to be the source of the failure o f 
demand theory because there have been a variety of studies using different functional 
forms. Nevertheless, numerous researchers, such as Varian (1982, 1983, 1985), DeBoer 
(1986), Chavas and Cox (1988), Chalfant and Alston (1988), SwofFord and Whitney (1987, 
1994), and Swofford (1995), have cited this disadvantage of parametric tests. The 
fundamental shortcoming in this regard is that the parametric test is really a joint test o f the 
structure of the underlying utility and the choice of particular functional form. When the 
observed data set fails to accept the assumption of utility maximization, hence the validity 
o f demand theory, there is no way of knowing whether the failure is due to data 
inconsistency or to the choice of an inappropriate functional form of preference [see, for 
example, Famulari (1995), p.372].
Another disadvantage of parametric tests is that they require more observations than 
the number of parameters to be estimated, as pointed out by Swofford and Whitney (1994) 
and Swofford (1995). In the translog utility example described in Section 3.1.1 above, there
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are at least fourteen parameters to be estimated for the unrestricted models for a system of 
three budget share equations, with any two service categories being estimated. The number 
of parameters to be estimated increases to twenty-seven for a system of four budget share 
equations, with any three service categories being estimated. It is well-known in 
econometrics that the number o f observations has to be a t least equal to the number of 
parameters to be estimated, and in this case the degrees o f freedom will be too small as to 
render the statistical results unacceptable. Thus the number o f observations available to 
the researcher performing the parametric test often becomes a source of problem itself.
The advantages o f nonparametric tests are therefore clear: the method requires no 
ad hoc functional form specifications, and when only a small number o f observations is 
available, the revealed preference approach is clearly to be preferred to parametric ones. 
But nonparametric tests are not without drawbacks: Nonparametric tests are capable of 
only showing whether or not the observed data set can be viewed as the result of 
constrained optimization. They offer no statistical criteria for evaluating functional 
relationships among key variables. And for public policy purposes, parametric tests are still 
necessary in order to obtain coefiBcient estimates of policy control variables (the 
explanatory variables) so that the effects of their changes on policy target variables (the 
dependent variable) can be approximated and studied. Nonparametric tests do not provide 
such policy-oriented guidance to researchers. Thus to get "the best of two worlds," 
nonparametric tests should be performed to check data consistency. Once the consistency 
characteristic is established, parametric tests that use flexible functional specifications for 
the underlying preferences can be undertaken for policy purposes.
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3.2 Data: Taiwan's Hsien and Municipal Data
The data set utilized to perform both parametric and nonparametric tests is drawn 
from the public spending and employment data of Taiwan's current sixteen "Hsiens" and 
five provincially designated "Municipalities" from 1986 to 1994. A Hsien in Taiwan is 
comparable to a county in the United States. These Hsien and Municipal goverrunents are 
administratively equal in rank in the hierarchical order of government structure under the 
provincial government of Taiwan: under a Hsien, there are smaller cities, townships and 
villages; under a provincially designated Municipality, there are districts. These Hsien and 
Municipal governments are all general-purpose local political administrative agencies, 
providing, under the aegis of the provincial government of Taiwan, a variety o f public 
goods and services that include: general administration and civil affairs; primary and 
secondary education Oienceforth public education); transportation/public road services and 
maintenance; social welfare including social insurance, social relief, employment services 
and public health; community development and environmental protection, public safety 
including both police and fire protection; grants and aids to lower-leveled administrative 
units, etc.
Of these public services, public education is the single most important function of 
the Hsien and Municipal governments, accounting for an average o f more than 45 percent 
o f total local current account expenditures. Public safety is the second most important 
local public function, accounting for about 15 percent of total local current account 
expenditures. Together these two functions account for as high as 72 percent of current 
account spending for some Hsiens and Municipalities, with an overall average o f 61
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percent for all localities during the 1986-94 period. Table 1 provides a summary of local 
public service to total current account expenditures ratios for public education and public 
safety by year during the 1986-94 period. In terms of employment, public education and 
public safety are also the two most important local government functions, with the 
former accounting for an average of more than 55 percent of local public employment. 
These two functions together account for approximately three-fourths of local public sector 
employment. Table 2 provides a summary of local public service to total public sector 
employment ratios.
Because of limited data availability, this research focuses on four public service 
categories: public education, public safety, public health, and environmental protection. 
Full-time employment data for each of the four public functions is used as a proxy for the 
quantity of public goods received by the citizenry and the average wage rate for each 
public service category is used as a proxy for the unit price of that public function.
In empirical studies, per capita expenditures are typically used to proxy service 
level under the assumption that the services are produced under constant returns 
technology. Alternatively, public sector employment and wages for each service category 
can be assumed to be equivalent to public output and prices. For this alternative approach 
to be valid, however, three conditions must hold: First, employment is proportional to 
output. This implies that public output varies directly with public employment. Second, 
the quality of labor input is the same across jurisdictions. This implies that output 
differences among jurisdictions can be explained by employment differences. And finally, 
the prices of nonlabor inputs do not vary across jurisdictions. This implies that the prices 
of public services vary directly with public sector wages. The public employment
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Table 1. Maximum, Minimum and Mean Ratios of Local Service Current Account




























1986 .623 J74 .494 .184 .114 .148 .642
(Taipei H.) (Taichung M.) (.078) (Ch%i H.) (Taichung M.) (.017)
1987 .610 _362 .487 .189 .115 .150 .637
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.072) (Hsinchu H.) (Taichung M.) (.022)
1988 J85 .381 .486 .184 .122 .147 633
(TaoyuanH.) (Keelung M.) (.064) (Hsinchu H.) (Taichung M.) (.019)
1989 J79 .217 .443 241 .073 .144 .587
(Taipei H.) (Taichung M.) (.088) (Penghu H.) (Taichung M.) (.036)
1990 J73 J26 .453 255 .108 .147 .600
(Taipei H.) (Penghu H.) (.072) (Penghu H.) (Nantou H.) (.034)
1991 jsei .J44 .464 271 .043 .156 .620
(Taoyuan H.) (Penghu H.) (.060) (Penghu H.) (ChiayiM.) (041)
1992 J67 J46 .470 241 .081 .151 .621
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.059) (Penghu H.) (ChiayiM.) (032)
1993 J40 J36 .437 247 .115 .146 .583
(Changhwa H.) (Penghu H.) (.055) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (.032)
1994 .552 J23 .455 269 .114 .157 .602
(Taipei H.) Penghu H.) (.058) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (.037)
Average .465 .150 .614
a: "H" stands for Hsien, and "M" for Municipality. Jiuisdictions in parentheses indicate 
where the respective maximum or minimum ratios take place, 
b: Sources: These ratios are calculated from the expenditure data from various editions of 
the Annual Report: Financial Statistics o f Taiwan Province, Department of Finance, 
Taiwan Provincial Government, 
c: The numbers in parentheses in columns (1) and (2) are standard deviations.
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Table 2. Maximum, Minimum and Mean Ratios of Local Service Employment to 




























1986 .677 .460 .568 .199 .113 .152 .720
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.057) (Hsinchu H.) (Changhwa H.) (026)
1987 .672 .447 567 202 .116 .154 .721
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.060) (Hsinchu H.) (Changhwa H.) (.028)
1988 .665 _388 .561 295 .116 .166 .727
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.070) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (.043)
1989 .668 J68 j60 J26 .112 .167 .727
(Taoyuan H.) (Penghu H.) (.075) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (.050)
1990 .673 J69 .563 _318 .109 .168 .731
(TaoyuanH.) (Penghu H.) (.077) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (.050)
1991 .675 357 .558 J21 .109 .173 .731
(Taichung M.) (Penghu H.) (.074) (Penghu H.) (Tainan H.) (048)
1992 .653 357 .549 J36 .155 .201 .750
(Taoyuan H.) (Penghu H.) (.067) (Penghu H.) (Taichung H.) (.044)
1993 .636 J32 .537 J93 .175 .215 .754
(Taoyuan H.) (Penghu H.) (.064) (Penghu H.) (Hsinchu H.) (050)
1994 .663 357 559 J95 .155 JOS .764
(Taoyuan H.) Penghu H.) (.072) (Penghu H.) (Taichung M.) (054)
Average .558 .178 .736
a: See Table 1.
b: Sources: These ratios are calculated from the employment data from various editions 
of the Statistical Abstract o f  Personnel Affairs in Taiwan Province, Department of 
Personnel, Taiwan Provincial Government, 
c: The numbers in parentheses in columns (1) and (2) are standard deviations.
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approach to measuring public output also assumes that the public sector production uses 
a Leontief fixed-coefiBcient technology, which is identical across all jurisdictions [Bahl, 
Johnson and Wasylenko (1980, pp. 99-100); Grosskopf and Hayes (1983, p. 209); and 
DeBoer (1986, p. 91)].
The assumption of Leontief fixed-factor production technology precludes the 
possibility of labor-capital substitution. Note that the Cobb-Douglas constant return to 
scale production technology can also be shown to satisfy the three conditions described 
above. For example, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) use the Cobb-Douglas production 
function and assume that labor and capital are the only two types o f factors o f production. 
Since capital is typically assumed to be perfectly mobile, while labor is not, across all 
political units, the rental price per unit of capital is invariant for all jurisdictions. However, 
the Cobb-Douglas production function implies the possibility of considerable substitution 
among factors of production, which, it can be argued, may be questionable for certain types 
o f public service production. For instance, Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980, p. 100) 
use the example of police to argue that a unit of police output requires a policeman plus 
certain amount o f expenditures for his uniform, gun, club, patrol car, etc. Thus the public 
employment approach typically assumes a fixed-factor production technology in the public 
sector.
The justification for choosing a fixed-factor production technology over the 
constant returns technology does not necessarily mean that the public sector employment 
^proach is superior to the per capita expenditures method in measuring public output. As 
Bahl, Johnson and Wasylenko (1980) point out, the equality of labor quality condition in
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a cross-sectional analysis ignores geographical diversity, and in a  time-series analysis this 
condition is equivalent to assuming that labor productivity does not vary over time. 
Because of the stringent conditions and obvious drawbacks, this public sector employment 
approach should be employed with care. Data availability typically dictates which 
approach is followed, as is the case in this study.
For this research, the use of public employment and wages is justified despite these 
drawbacks. First, local public sector services in Taiwan are provided with labor-intensive 
production technologies, with labor’s share accounting for an average of about 75 percent 
of total noncapital expenses for all localities in each year during the 1986-94 period.* 
Second, population notwithstanding, Taiwan is a small political unit, about one-third the 
size of the State o f Louisiana. The sixteen Hsiens and five Municipalities are contiguous 
sub-level political entities in which there are no legal or institutional restrictions to firee 
labor mobility. Therefore, as far as Taiwan is concerned, the constant labor quality 
assumption is reasonably well justified in the cross-section analysis.
As noted above, the use of public employment and wages to proxy public output 
and prices assumes that public sector prices vary directly with public sector wages. It is 
well known in the spatial economics literature that even when labor is homogeneous and 
mobile, wages will vary across regions, depending upon the relative size o f the urban areas 
contained in the regions [Brueckner (1987), p. 837]. Therefore, public sector wage
'Please see Table 7 on p. 84 and Table 12 on p. 87 in Chapter 4 for avearge overall labor 
share at the local level.
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dififerentials across jurisdictions in Taiwan are expected. The 1986-94 data set confirms
this expectation.^
Data on current account expenditures by function and aggregated wages and 
salaries for each of the Hsien and Municipality are drawn from the Annual Report: 
Financial Statistics o f  Taiwan Province, various editions, published by the Department of 
Finance, Taiwan Provincial Government. Data on full-time employment by function for 
each Hsien and Municipality are drawn from the Statistical Abstract o f Personnel Affairs 
in Taiwan Province, various editions, published by the Department of Persoimel, Taiwan 
Provincial Government GNP deflators, for adjusting for price changes over time, are from 
the Quarterly National Economic Trends, published in August 1995 by the Directorate- 
General of Accounting, Budget and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, Republic o f China.
For the probit analysis, additional data are collected. Data on population and 
population density for each Hsien and Municipality are from the Annual Report o f  Interior 
o f the Republic o f China, various editions, published by Department o f Statistics, Ministry 
o f Interior, Republic o f China. Data on the number of eligible voters and voter turnouts, 
also at local level, for the 1985,1989 and 1993 elections o f magistrates and mayors are 
drawn from the Statistical Abstract ofInterior o f the Republic o f China, the 1993 edition, 
also published by Department of Statistics, Ministry of Interior, Republic of China. Data 
on election results from the above-mentioned Hsien and Municipality elections are from 
the Statistics on Civil Affairs, Taiwan Province, No. 24, published by Department o f Civil
^Please see Tables 8 and 9 on p. 85 and Table 12 on p. 87 in Chapter 4 for the calculated 
average wage rates for public education and public safety in the cross-section and pooled 
data sets.
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affaire, Taiwan Provincial Government. Data on annual family income, disaggregated at 
local level, are from the Report on the Survey o f Family Income and Expenditure, Taiwan 
Province, Republic o f  China, various editions, published by Department o f Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan provincial Government.




Using employment and average wage rate in public service category / as a proxy 
for output Xj and price Pj, PjXj / M in the budget share equations (9), (10) and (II)  then 
becomes labor’s share of public spending in service category i. This labor share variable 
is used as the dependent variable in parametric tests. For nonparametric tests, P; Xj, the 
total wage bill in service category /, and Pj X,, the wage bill in service category j  calculated 
using service category /’s average wage rate, are used instead.
In order to calculate average wage rate for each local service category under this 
study, an assumption has to be made. Since only the aggregated wage and salary data, 
which is not broken down by service category, for each locality is available, it is 
conveniently assumed that the ratio of wage bill to current account expenditures for each 
local function in each locality is the same as the overall ratio in that jurisdiction. 
Admittedly, it is a strong assumption. There is, however, no way to get around the data 
limitation. The extent to which this assumption may be driving the empirical results, 
however, can be and will be examined later with the technique of sensitivity analysis.
In all of the statistical test procedures performed in this dissertation research, 
including parametric, nonparametric, sensitivity analysis and probit analysis, whenever
'In order to perform the nonparametric tests, a SAS-IML computer program, shown in 
Appendix B, was written based on the PASCAL program supplied by Professor Hal R. 
Varian and the IML program supplied by Professor Lawrence DeBoer. My thanks are due 
to these two professors.
60
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time-series or pooled data are used, ail monetary values are properly adjusted for inflation 
over time by GNP deflators.
4.2 Parametric Results
As described in Section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3, in performing parametric tests using a 
translog utility specification, the total number of budget share equations as in equation (9) 
that can be estimated depends to a large extent on the number of observations. Because 
there are only twenty-one cross-section observations each year for this study, the maximum 
number of budget share equations in the model cannot be more than three, with two of 
these three, such as equations (10) and (11), being actually estimated. With a system of 
three budget share equations, the total number of parameters to be estimated would be 
fourteen for the unrestricted model. The number of parameters to be estimated would 
escalate to be twenty-seven if four budget share equations were specified. Thanks to this 
limitation, only three local public services are selected for parametric tests: public 
education, public safety, and all other functions. The selection of the first two public 
services is obvious: these two are the most important local public sector functions during 
the period under study. The third service category is otherwise referred to as "residual 
category" that includes all other public services provided by local governments [Grosskopf 
and Hayes, (1983)]. Since there are only nine observation points in the time-series data set 
for each jurisdiction, no time-series analyses are attempted.
The budget share equations were estimated on the nine cross-section data sets and 
the pooled cross-section and time-series data set using both S AS and SHAZAM nonlinear
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maximum likelihood estimation procedures/ Although these two statistical packages 
utilize different algorithms, the former using the GAUSS-NEWTON iteration algorithm 
Wiile the latter a quasi-NEWTON method, the resultant estimates are similar to the extent 
that convergence is reachable. Because of the highly nonlinear nature o f the budget share 
equations in a translog utility specification and of the high degree of multicollinearity 
among the exogenous variables in the equations, however, it has been extremely difBcult 
to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters. The source o f multicollinearity comes 
fiom the feet that the value of Xj, the residual category, is derived by subtracting X„ public 
education employment data, and X ,^ public safety employment data, fi-om total 
employment Attempts to test the separability assumptions, although highly desirable since 
many studies in the field of public finance have focused on a single service category (e.g. 
public education or fire protection), have also failed for precisely the same reason. 
Therefore, no reports of the separability tests will be presented in this dissertation.
To the extent that it is possible to obtain estimates of the parameters at all, the 
usefidness o f those estimates is highly questionable. Nevertheless, results for 1986,1994 
and the pooled data set are reported in Table 3. Estimates for 1986 are not very precise, 
judging fiom the high standard error estimates o f the parameters for the unrestricted model. 
Estimates for the pooled data set are not useful either, because o f the obviously biased 
estimates (e.g. a, = 10,999) for all coefBcients and the unusually high standard error 
estimates o f the parameters for the restricted model. Estimates for the 1994 date set do
^An example of the S AS program is presented in Appendix A. It is partially annotated, but 
otherwise quite easy to follow. The SHAZAM program is very similar to the SAS 
program, so no examples o f the former are presented.
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Table 3. Estimates of the Parameters of the Direct Translog Utility Function'
1986 1994 1986-94 Pooled Data
Parameters Unrestricted Utility-Max Unrestricted Utility-Max Unrestricted Utility-Max
Model Model Model Model Model Model
«1 .0660 .0506 -J861** -2205 -3590** 10,999
(.7241) (2993) (.0531) (.1360) (.0449) (230,540)
«2 .7368 -.1118** -.1638** -2012** -.1585** -88236
(3921) (.0322) (.0072) ( .0361) (.0107) (18,490)
« 3 -1.8028" -.9388" -.4501" -.5783" -.4825" -10,117.64"
P . . .0989 -.0647 -.0231* -.0714 -.0020 -3,535.3
(2200) (.0552) (.0542) ( .0490) (.0487) (74,099)
P .2 2708 .0441** .1013 .0554** .0384 1,102.8
(.4231) (.0208) ( .0525) ( .0204) (.0339) (23,115)
P .3 -.4104 -.0131 -.0368 .0145 -.0022 -193.35
(.6931) (.0343) (.1047) ( .0236) (.0546) (4,0532)
P z , -1.9987 .0441** -.0094 .0554** -.0601** 1,102.8
(86.46) (.0208) (.0116) ( .0204) (.0214) (23,115)
P = -.6874 .0444** -.0015 -.0816** -.0009 -1,627.9
(29.42) (.0261) (.0107) ( .0372) (.0116) (34,120)
P23 2.3883 -.0039 .0311* .0310** .0810** -59.10
(101.89) (.0104) (.0159) (.0135) (.0295) (1238.8)




































109.66 103.46 110.52 106.97 727.70 710.80
a : Standard error estimates are in parentheses, 
b : Calculated from the formula =-1- 
* : Asymptotically significant at the 10% level. 
**: Asymptotically significant at the 5% level.
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appear to be acceptable overall. Failure to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters 
for other years, however, casts serious doubts on the robustness of the estimates reported 
in Table 3.
If the estimates can be accepted on their face values, then a log-likelihood function 
ratio test can be performed to test the maintained hypothesis of constrained utility 
maximization. For instance, the %^-statistic for 1986 is calculated to be 12.40, for 1994, 
7.10, and for the pooled data, 33.80. The degrees o f freedom for this test are determined 
by the number o f restrictions imposed on the utility-maximization model, which in this 
case is six. The critical values are 12.60 and 16.812 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively. One therefore carmot reject the hypothesis of constrained optimization for 
1986 and for 1994. The utility maximization hypothesis, however, would be rejected at the 
1% significance level for the pooled data.
It is o f  interest to note that these results are not consistent with the findings of 
Grosskopf and Hayes (1983). They also use a translog utility specification for their study 
of 1977 public sector noncapital expenditures and employment data from 132 Illinois 
municipalities. In their study, three local public services were chosen: police, fire and 
residual functions. Their test results reject the utility maximization assumption.
Although the parametric results from this study are not satisfactory overall, they 
appear to be consistent with the nonparametric results to be reported in the next section. 
4 3  Nonparametric Results
In performing nonparametric tests, the number o f service categories that can be 
selected depends only on data availability. Data on public health and environmental
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protection are either incomplete or simply not available prior to 1991. Therefore, in cross- 
section analysis, only three service categories: public education, public safety, and all other 
services, are selected for 1986 through 1990. Public health and environmental protection 
are, however, included for analysis for 1991 through 1994. In time-series analysis, only 
the first three service categories are included.
Results fix)m utility maximization consistency tests using nonparametric techniques 
are reported in Tables 4 and 5.  ^ For cross-section local government employment data, two 
violations o f GAR? are found for 1987, with one direct violation of WARP and one 
violation of transitivity. No violations of GARP are found for 1986, nor are there 
violations for 1988 through 1994. For time-series local public sector employment data, one 
direct violation of GARP is found in one jurisdiction (Keelimg Municipality) and six 
violations o f GARP are found in another jurisdiction (Taichung Municipality), with three 
direct violations o f WARP and three violations of transitivity. Other than that, no other 
violations are present for the other nineteen local public sector time-series data.
Nonparametric tests are also performed on a pooled cross-section and time-series 
local government employment data using the same three service categories that are 
available for all years as in parametric tests. For this pooled data set, there are a total of 
179 observations, with a total of (179xl78)/2 = 15,931 possible violations o f WARP and 
a total o f at least 179^=5,735,339 potential violations of the transitive closures."* 20
^An example o f the nonparametric test program is presented in Appendix B. It is also 
partially annotated.
*SeeVarian(1982,pp. 971-2).
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Table 4. Utility Maximization Consistency Tests for Cross-Section Local Public
Sector Employment Data
Year No. of Violations*
1986 None
1987 2
(Taoyuan H. -D- Taichung H. 








* "D" denotes violations o f direct consistency, i.e. violations of WARP. "T" denotes 
violations of transitivity. D and T together constitute total number of violations of 
GARP.
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Table 5. Utility Maximization Consistency Tests for Time Series Local Public Sector
Employment Data




















(1 9 8 9 -D -1990 
1989-D - 1991
1 9 8 9 -D -1992
1990-T  - 1991 
1990-T  - 1992 




* See Table 4.
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violations o f WARP and 87 violations o f transitivity, for a total of 107 GARP violations, 
are found. These represent 0.13% and 0.0015% of possible violations of WARP and 
transitivity, respectively. These violations are reported in Table 6.
It is worth noting that prior to the complete data set for the 1986-94 period was 
collected, the same nonparametric test procedures were performed on the pooled data set 
excluding the 1986 and 1992 data, and a total o f 27 GARP violations, with 11 direct and 
16 transitivity violations, were found. The inclusion of the 1986 and 1992 data to the 
complete pooled data set appears to increase greatly the total number of GARP violations. 
On closer inspection, this seemingly abnormal jump in the number of GARP violations 
may be attributable simply to the exponential increase in total potential violations when the 
number of observations in the data set is increased. In the pooled data set excluding the 
1986 and 1992 data, there are 139 observations, indicating a total of (139x138)72 = 9,591 
potential violations of WARP and a total o f 139  ^= 2,685,619 potential violations o f the 
transitive closures. The actual violations found in the truncated data set represent 0.11% 
and .0006% of total possible violations o f WARP and transitivity, respectively. These 
latter figures appear to be in line with those found in the complete pooled data set. 
Whichever data set is used, it is clear that the actual number of GARP violations represents 
only a small percentage of total potential violations.
It is o f interest to compare the nonparametric results from this study with those of 
DeBoer (1986). DeBoer performs nonparametric tests on both cross-section and time- 
series state-level (including the District o f Columbia) public sector employment and wage 
data in the 1970-82 period. He includes education, highways, welfare, hospitals and
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Table 6. Utility Maximization Consistency Tests for the 1986-94 Pooled Data Set*
Number Year District Type o f Violation Year District
I 1986 Taoyuan H. D 1989 Tainan H.
2 1986 Taoyuan H. D 1989 Kaoshiung H.
3 1986 Taoyuan H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
4 1986 Taoyuan H. D 1993 Tainan H.
5 1986 Hsinchu H D 1987 IlanH.
6 1986 MiaoIiH T 1986 Taoyuan H.
7 1986 Miaoli H T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
8 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
9 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
10 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1988 Kaoshiung H.
11 1986 Kaoshiung H. D 1989 Tainan H.
12 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
13 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
14 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
15 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1992 Kaoshiung H.
16 1986 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
17 1986 Keelung M. D 1987 Keelung M.
18 1986 Taichung M. T 1987 Taichung M.
19 1986 Taichung M. T 1988 Tainan M.
20 1986 Taichung M. T 1989 Nantou H.
21 1986 Taichung M. T 1989 Tainan M.
22 1986 Taichung M. T 1990 Nantou H.
23 1987 llan H. D 1988 Hsinchu H.
24 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
25 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
26 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Kaoshiung H.
27 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1988 Kaoshiung H.
* See Table 4.
(table con’d.)
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Number Year District Type of Violation Year District
28 1987 Kaoshiung H. D 1989 Tainan H.
29 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
30 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
31 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
32 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1992 Kaoshiung H.
33 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
34 1987 Kaoshiung H. T 1994 Pingtung H.
35 1987 Taichung M. T 1989 Tainan M.
36 1987 Taichung M. T 1990 Nantou H.
37 1987 Tainan M. T 1986 Taichung M.
38 1987 Tainan M. T 1987 Taichung M.
39 1987 Tainan M. T 1988 Tainan M.
40 1987 Tainan M. D 1989 Nantou H.
41 1987 Tainan M. T 1989 Tainan M.
42 1987 Tainan M. D 1990 Nantou H.
43 1988 Taoyuan H. D 1993 Kaoshiung H.
44 1988 TaoyuanH. D 1994 Tainan H.
45 1988 Hsinchu H. T 1986 Hsinchu H.
46 1988 Nantou H. T 1987 Tainan M.
47 1988 Nantou H. T 1988 Tainan M.
48 1988 Nantou H. T 1989 Nantou H.
49 1988 Nantou H. T 1989 Tainan M.
50 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
51 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
52 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
53 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
54 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
(table con’d.)
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Number Year District Type o f Violation Year District
55 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1992 Kaoshiung H.
56 1988 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
57 1988 Tainan M. T 1987 Taichung M.
58 1988 Tainan M. T 1989 Nantou H.
59 1988 Tainan M. T 1989 Tainan M.
60 1988 Tainan M. D 1990 Nantou H.
61 1989 Hsinchu H. D 1992 IlanH.
62 1989 Tainan H. T 1986 Taichung H.
63 1989 Tainan H. T 1988 Kaoshiung H.
64 1989 Tainan H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
65 1989 Tainan H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
66 1989 Tainan H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
67 1989 Tainan H. T 1992 Kaoshiung H.
68 1989 Tainan H. T 1993 Tainan H.
69 1989 Tainan H. T 1994 Pingtung H.
70 1989 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
71 1989 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
72 1989 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
73 1989 Taichung M. D 1990 Taichung M.
74 1989 Taichung M. D 1991 Taichung M.
75 1989 Taichung M. D 1992 Taichung M.
76 1989 Taichung M. D 1992 Tainan M.
77 1989 Tainan M. D 1990 Nantou H.
78 1990 Nantou H. T 1988 Nantou H.
79 1990 Nantou H. T 1989 Nantou H.
80 1990 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
81 1990 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
(table con’d.)
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Number Year District Type of Violation Year District
82 1990 Kaoshiung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
83 1990 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
84 1990 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
85 1990 Taichung M. T 1990 Taichung M.
86 1990 Taichung M. T 1992 Tainan M.
87 1991 Kaoshiung H. D 1993 Tainan H.
88 1991 Taichung M. T 1990 Taichung M.
89 1991 Taichung M. T 1992 Taichung M.
90 1991 Taichung M. T 1992 Tainan M.
91 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
92 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
93 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
94 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
95 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
96 1992 Kaoshiung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
97 1992 Tainan M. T 1992 Taichung M.
98 1993 Tainan H. T 1986 Taichung H.
99 1993 Kaoshiung H. T 1994 Tainan H.
100 1994 Pingtung H. T 1986 Taoyuan H.
101 1994 Pingtung H. T 1986 Taichung H.
102 1994 Pingtung H. T 1988 Kaoshiung H.
103 1994 Pingtung H. T 1989 Kaoshiung H.
104 1994 Pingtung H. T 1990 Kaoshiung H.
105 1994 Pingtung H. T 1991 Kaoshiung H.
106 1994 Pingtung H. T 1992 Kaoshiung H.
107 1994 Pingtung H. T 1993 Tainan H.
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residual categories in his study, and finds a small number of GARP violations for both the 
cross-section and time-series data set He concludes that since the number o f violations 
is so small that the assumption of utility maximization in the public sector could probably 
be accepted. The nonparametric results firom this study appear to be consistent with those 
of DeBoer.
In a strictly theoretical sense, as long as a single violation of GARP is found, the 
data set cannot be described as the outcome of constrained utility maximization [Varian 
(1982), p. 949]. Varian(1985), however, contends that if the data fails the tests by "only 
a small amount" which is attributable to measurement error, omitted variables, or other 
stochastic influences, one may not want to reject the maintained hypothesis outright. 
Viewed in this light, given the extremely small number, and also extremely small 
percentage, of GARP violations in either cross-section or time-series or pooled data in this 
study, one is tempted to conclude that the data set provides strong evidence o f bureaucratic 
constrained utility maximization in Taiwan's local public sector fiscal behavior.
Note that in testing the local government utility maximization assumption, both 
Grosskopf and Hayes (1983), using the parametric technique, and DeBoer (1986), using 
the nonparametric technique, rely on U. S. data that reflect the strong interactions of 
voters/taxpayers and public sector bureaucracies. Their studies are therefore unable to 
isolate bureaucratic preferences. In contrast, this dissertation study uses Taiwan’s data that 
better reflects bureaucratic preferences, as noted earlier. So although the nonparametric 
results fiom this study are consistent with those of DeBoer, this study provides a better test 
of the bureaucratic utility maximization assumption.
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To sum up the nonparametric results: The small nmnber of GARP violations in the 
time-series tests suggests that the local bureaucracies in general have well-defined 
preferences over local public sector employment and spending patterns. The small number 
o f GARP violations in the cross-section tests finther indicates a surprising amount of 
intertemporal stability in the preference structures across local bureaucracies in Taiwan. 
The consistent outcomes fi:om the cross-section, time-series and pooled data tests together 
provide a strong support for the assumption of bureaucratic utility maximization in the 
literature.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Recall that the labor shares for individual local services are assumed earlier to be 
equal to the overall labor share at the local level in order to facilitate calculations of 
average wage rates for each service category, thanks to data limitations. In order to assess 
the extent to which the method used for calculating average wage rates may be affecting 
the results, additional tests were performed. As a start, the average wage rates are 
recalculated based upon Borcherding and Deacon’s (1972, p.895) labor share estimates 
for education (ranging firom .6449 to .7899), police (.7947), fire (.7487), health-hospitals 
(.5677), and sewers-sanitation (ranging firom .2775 to .4175). Interestingly, no GARP 
violations can be found for wage rates constructed using these estimates. Violations of 
GARP in the data set can only be found when extreme labor share values, like .3 for public 
education and/or .2 for public safety, are used in the wage rate calculations. This exercise 
is, however, arbitrary at best.
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In an attempt to perform the tests in a more systematic fashion for the purpose of 
establishing an upper and a lower bound for labor share in the two public service categories 
(i.e. public education and public safety) within which violations of GARP can be found, 
an iterative procedure was added to the SAS-IML program shown in Appendix B. This 
iterative procedure was specified in such a way that the GARP calculations would be 
performed starting from a value of 0 . 0 1  (i.e. 1 %), with an increment of 0 . 0 1  after each 
iteration up to 1  (i.e. 1 0 0 %), for labor share in public education against each value between 
0.01 to 1, also with an increment of 0.01, for labor share in public safety. Therefore, there 
are a total of 10,000 iterations of the GARP procedures that were applied to the cross- 
section data for each year from 1986 to 1994.
Two things should be noted at this point. First, in earlier nonparametric tests, labor 
share for each service category is assumed to be the same as the overall labor share at the 
local level, which varies across all jurisdictions each year. In performing this sensitivity 
analysis, labor shares for public education and public safety are assumed to be identical for 
all jurisdictions, varied by the increment of one percentage point in each iterative 
procedure. Second, in the sensitivity analysis, labor share in the residual service category 
is assumed to be constant at each iterative step, equal to the overall share at the local level, 
which, as noted above, varies across all jurisdictions. That is to say, the residual service 
category is excluded from the analysis.
While it may seem desirable to also include the residual service category in this 
sensitivity analysis, the attempt is aborted eventually due to three practical considerations. 
The first is that, as reported earlier, the services amalgamated into the residual service
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category are not very important in terms of either current account expenditures or public 
sector employment as compared with public education and public safety. Besides, since 
this residual service category is an aggregate o f all other local services put together, no 
insight about each specific service would be gained even if  it is included in the analysis. 
The third consideration is concerned with the demand on computer time this iteration 
procedure requires. For each cross-section data, it took an average o f 370 minutes for a 
mainfiame computer to process the 10,000 iterations just outlined above. If a third service 
category is included in the analysis, there would be a total o f 1 0 0 ^=1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0  iterations of 
the GARP procedures. This would mean an average of 37,000 minutes (more than 600 
hours!) o f computer time for each cross-section data. While this is not impossible with a 
modern-day mainfiame computer, this is hardly practical.
For public education and public safety, each pair o f labor shares between 1 % to 100 
% that produces violations of GARP is identified for the cross-section data in each year. 
For each year, these pairs then form a sample set with which further statistical procedures 
are performed. Specifically, these pairs are plotted against each other to produce a scatter 
diagram, one for each year between 1986 and 1994, as shown in Figure 4. In each panel, 
labor share in public education is represented by the horizontal axis, whereas that o f public 
safety by the vertical axis. The lines (not shown) that trace along the outer edges o f the 
starred area represent the upper and lower bounds of labor shares in these two service 
categories that would cause the data set to show violations o f GARP.
For purposes of cross reference and in conjunction with the reading of Figure 4, 
several tables containing descriptive statistics o f the data set about labor shares, average
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Figure 4. Sensitivity Analysis of Labor Shares in Public spending
Note: In each panel, ED SHARE is labor share in public education, 
and PS SHARE stands for labor share in public safety.
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wage rates and employment are also included in this chapter. Table 7 presents the 
maximum, minimum, mean and standard deviation o f overall labor share at the local level 
from the original cross-section data set. Sample statistics o f the calculated average wage 
rates for public education and public safety from cross-section data are reported in Tables 
8  and 9, respectively. Tables 10 and 11 present sample statistics o f employment in these 
two local public services. Sample statistics o f labor share, average wage rates and 
employment for the pooled data set is reported in Table 12.
In each panel of Figure 4, the dot indicates, approximately, the location of the
mean value o f local overall labor share. The circle around the dot represents, again 
approximately, an area that is one standard deviation away from the mean value. For the 
1986 and 1987 data, it is shown that the mean values o f labor share are close, within one 
standard deviation, to the starred area. For all other cross-section data, the dot is 
nowhere near the starred area.
Three interesting observations can be made about these scatter diagrams in Figure 
4. First, on the average, the starred area represents a small portion of total possible labor 
share pairs, indicating a strong tendency for the observed data set to conform to the 
constrained optimization principles. Second, although there are no uniform patterns of the 
starred areas for all the diagrams, some similarities do stand out. For both very high and 
very low values o f the labor share pairs, with a few exceptions as shown in Panels A and 
B, no violations of GARP can be found in the observed data set. Since labor share is an 
indicator o f labor intensity in the production of the particular public service in question, 
this would mean that when the provisions of public education and public safety use either
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Table 7. Sample Statistics of Labor Share in Local Public Expenditure, 
Cross-sectional Data*
Year Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
1986 0.96 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.07
1987 0 . 8 8 0.62 0.75 0.76 0.07
1988 0.87 0.62 0.74 0.75 0.06
1989 0.83 0.36 0.72 0.70 0 . 1 0
1990 0.84 0.52 0 . 6 8 0.69 0.09
1991 0.89 0.60 0.76 0.78 0.08
1992 0.91 0.59 0.79 0.80 0.07
1993 0 . 8 6 0.55 0.77 0.75 0.07
1994 0.91 0.59 0.78 0.76 0.08
*: Sources: See Table 1.
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Table 8. Sample Statistics o f Average Wage Rates for Public Education at 
Local Level*''’
Year Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
1986 325.60 244.01 292.23 289.05 21.93
1987 325.40 230.48 286.52 284.91 22.81
1988 377.07 272.12 314.12 320.40 26.73
1989 416.16 163.89 331.43 330.60 54.11
1990 493.79 286.48 402.87 390.26 48.35
1991 643.43 452.85 567.26 553.41 50.25
1992 828.19 501.30 673.66 668.89 73.36
1993 895.43 504.89 721.27 702.43 96.30
1994 894.82 569.64 758.09 719.54 91.60
a: Sources: See Tables 1 and 2.
b: These figures are in current dollars. Each unit represents one thousand New 
Taiwan Dollars (NTS 1,000).
Table 9. Sample Statistics of Average Wage Rates for Public Safety at 
Local Level*’*’
Year Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
1986 394.40 276.55 324.88 323.87 31.18
1987 374.67 270.02 327.26 325.93 28.45
1988 435.08 192.59 326.07 337.50 58.23
1989 474.15 260.75 362.77 365.55 61.92
1990 619.10 274.82 415.76 440.07 101.7
1991 1084.38 128.27 608.01 627.67 188.24
1992 753.14 261.32 583.87 594.90 101.97
1993 743.51 455.69 584.31 586.83 72.72
1994 823.98 504.20 655.59 675.55 80.93
a: Sources: See Tables 1 and 2. 
b: See Table 8  above.
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Year Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
1986 15,828 930 3,937 5,032 3,304
1987 16,462 903 4,069 5,081 3,439
1988 16,805 884 4,238 5,099 3,515
1989 17,259 869 4,438 5,172 3,615
1990 17,667 851 4,521 5,225 3,716
1991 17,607 832 3,607 4,849 3,654
1992 17,426 818 3,560 4,802 3,623
1993 17,433 836 3,608 4,834 3,606
1994 20,379 876 4,421 5,458 4,254
*.: Sources: See Table 2.
Table 11. Sample Statistics of Public Safety Employment at Local Level*
Year Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
1986 3,633 369 1,115 1,239 664
1987 3,749 395 1,093 1,262 6 8 6
1988 4,119 673 1,097 1,344 745
1989 4,034 758 1,095 1,352 725
1990 4,452 727 1,068 1,377 820
1991 4,972 620 1,052 1,344 918
1992 5,186 637 1,239 1,575 966
1993 5,899 697 1,345 1,749 1 , 1 0 0
1994 6,033 693 1,365 1,772 1 , 1 2 2
*: Sources: See Table 2.
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Table 12. Sample Statistics of the Pooled Data Set, 1986-94*’
Variable Maximum Minimum Median Mean Std. Dev.
Labor Share 0.91 0.36 0.76 0.75 0.08
Employment in 
Public Education 20,379 818 4,069 5,058 3,575
Employment in 
Public Safety 6,033 369 1,203 1,453 885
Average Wage in 
Public Education 739.05 156.44 387.82 426.22 135.59
Average Wage in 
Public Safety 959.71 113.52 419.78 429.93 122.94
a: Sources: See Tables I and 2.
b: Wage rates are expressed in units of per thousand New Taiwan Dollars (NTS 1,000), 
and are properly adjusted for inflation. Given the current exchange rate o f 
approximately US$1 for NTS27, the annual mean average wage in public education 
of, say, 426.22 is equivalent to about US$15,786.
labor intensive or capital intensive technology, the public expenditure results can normally 
be viewed as the constrained optimization outcomes. And finally, the dot’s position 
relative to the starred area in each panel of Figure 4 helps to explain why there are so few 
GARP violations in the observed data set in the 1986-94 period. It also helps to validate 
the assumptions made earlier about labor share for public education and public safety in 
the nonparametric tests. As shown by this sensitivity analysis, the assumptions used to 
construct the wage rates do not appear to be crucial to the empirical results.
In sum, the conclusion fi:om this sensitivity analysis exercise is that, overall, the 
conclusions made about local bureaucracies’ utility fimctions based on GARP principles 
appear to be quite robust, and the results found in this study are not driven by the
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assumptions used to calculate the wage rates. Even if  actual labor shares differ 
considerably from the values assumed in the earlier part of this study, the GARP 
calculations will not be affected in any important way.
4.5 Probit Analysis
As reported above, the cross-section data shows 2 violations of GARP for 1987 and 
the time-series data shows 1 violation for Keelung Municipality and 6  violations for 
Taichung Municipality. And when the pooled data set is tested, 107 violations of GARP 
are found. Although the total number of violations is relatively small, and may perhaps be 
attributable to measurement error, it is tempting to see if these violations are caused by 
some underlying systematic socio-politico-economic changes during the 1986-94 period. 
When the 107 pairs of violations of GARP in the pooled data set are plotted against each 
other, there seems to be a pattern: the majority o f them cluster within the 1986-90 period.
In order to investigate potential determinants of GARP violations, the probit 
analysis technique is applied to the pooled data set to examine the factors affecting whether 
or not the Hsien and Municipality is likely to exhibit a GARP violation by using the 
violation status, Vj (V=0 if no violation, V=1 if  a violation), as the binary dependent 
variable in an empirical model with a variety o f socio-politico-economic variables as 
independent variables. As with both the parametric and nonparametric tests, the choice of 
variables is constrained by data availability during the period under study. This exercise 
is expected to enable us to identify the underlying socio-politico-economic factors that may 
have an effect on bureaucratic behaviors in Taiwan during the 1986-94 period.
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4.5.1 The P robit Model
Under the standard probit analysis, the model is so specified as to determine the 
probability that, given the jurisdiction-specific socio-economic characteristics, the 
bureaucracy in a particular jurisdiction will choose the public expenditure mix that violates 
GAR? principles. This probability is a function of an index of the bureaucracy’s 
propensity to select the expenditure patterns that are not consistent with G ARP. The index 
is in turn assumed to be a linear function of the jurisdiction’s socio-economic 
characteristics.
Using the random utility model approach,^ this index can be expressed as:
(17) I - X i 'B
where I; is the index or propensity for the bureaucracy in jurisdiction / to choose the public 
expenditure mix that violates GARP, is a (kxl) vector o f variables measuring the 
attributes o f the socio-economic characteristics pertaining to jurisdiction i, X,' represents 
the transpose of Xj, and B is a (kxl) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. In this 
context, k is the total number of the explanatory variables, including the intercept term.
The probability that the bureaucracy of a particular jurisdiction chooses an 
expenditure mix that is not consistent with GARP can be written as:
(18) P ( V i = l )  = P(I,*sI i)
where P( • ) denotes the probability, V, is the violation status binary choice variable for
jurisdiction i with a value o f 1 for GARP violations and a value of 0 otherwise, and I;* the
*For a more thorough treatment of the random utility model in probit analysis, please see 
Judge, GrifiBths, Hill, Liitkepohl and Lee (1985, pp. 753-68).
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/■* jurisdiction’s threshold for GARP violations. I * is assumed to be a standard normal 
random variable, which, like I,-, depends on those socio-economic factors pertaining to 
jurisdiction /. Therefore, the above equation becomes:
(19) P(Vi = l) = P ( i r  ^I;)  = F ( I ; )
where F ( Ij ) is the cumulative probability distribution function (c.d.f.) for Ij* evaluated 
at the Index Ij.
The probit model can then be expressed as:
(20) V; = I; + = X B  + Pi
where Vj can be called the “observed” probit, and Ij the “true” probit. p; is the random
disturbance term having a zero mean.^
Equation (20) can be estimated using the PROBIT procedure in either SHAZAM 
or SAS program package. The empirical probit model is specified as follows, suppressing 
subscripts i, for jurisdiction identification, and t, for time periods:
(21) V = Pi + P2  INCOME + P3  NONPARTY + P4  VOTE
+ Ps DENSITY + pg CITY + P? EMP/POP + Pg EMP/VOTER 
+ P9  SOUTH+ P 1 0  EAST + Pi 1 WEST + e
In the above empirical model specification, V is the dependent dummy variable 
assuming a value of 1 if jurisdiction i is found to have a violation o f GARP at time fin the
®The variance of p, is [P| (l-Pj)]/nj[f (F**(Pj)]^ where Oj is the n repetitions of the same 
choice situation for jurisdiction /, P; the proportion of jurisdiction i choosing the 
expenditure patterns that violate GARP in nj trials, f  the probability distribution function 
of a standard nonnal random variable, and F* the inverse fimction of the normal c.d.f. See 
Judge et al, op. cit. pp. 762-3.
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pooled data set, and a value of 0  otherwise. P/s are the coefBcients to be estimated, and 
e is the random disturbance term.
INCOME is a measure of annual family income at the local level. It is included in 
the probit model as a socio-economic control variable. There are no a  priori reasons to 
expect what kind o f effect this variable would have on the local bureaucracy’s spending 
behavior in Taiwan. One could conjecture, however, that various attributes o f so-called 
“quality o f life” are normal goods so that people’s concern over these issues rises with 
income. This appears to be true in Taiwan where the citizens are becoming increasingly 
vocal in recent years on a host of social welfare issues such as environment, social security, 
health, education, public transportation, leisure, etc. at the same time their living standards 
measured in traditional economic progress indices, i.e. GNP growth rates and per capita 
income, are rising. The government, however, has been slow in adjusting its traditional 
economic development policies that are not consistent with social goals, such as industrial 
production vs. conservation of the environment, and so on. To the extent that local public 
sector spending patterns reflect the preferences of the public sector bureaucracy, and to the 
extent that the voters/taxpayers are successful in influencing local politics as incomes rise, 
one would expect the sign of the INCOME coefficient to be positive.
NONPARTY is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if  the elected magistrate or 
mayor is not a member of the ruling party, and 0 otherwise. The central bureaucracy likely 
reflects the long time dominance of the KMT as the single ruling party. If local public 
sector spending patterns reflect the central bureaucracy’s preferences, then a magistrate or 
mayor who is not a member of the ruling party may have a stronger tendency than a party
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member ofiBcial to depart from the prevailing party line. The jurisdiction that elected a 
non-party member as its head of administration is therefore more likely to exhibit 
violations of GARP. The sign of this variable’s coefBcient is therefore expected to be 
positive.
VOTE is a measure of voter turnouts for the three elections o f the sixteen 
magistrates and five mayors that were held in 1985,1989 and 1993. It is a ratio of the 
number of ballots to total number of eligible voters in each Hsien and Municipality. Since 
there are only three data points for the VOTE variable, to construct a measure for this 
variable, the 1985 election data is used for 1986-88, the 1989 election data for 1989-92, 
and the 1993 election data for 1993 and 1994. Voter turnouts differ significantly across 
jurisdictions. For example, this ratio was as low as 56.6% for one Hsien (Taitung) and as 
high as 84.6% for another (Hsinchu) in the 1989 election. There are no a  priori reasons 
to expect how this factor may affect GARP violations in the pooled data set. On the one 
hand, one may argue that a high voter turnout may be the result of the ruling party’s ability 
to mobilize voters to go to the voting booth both as a demonstration of party support and 
as an indication of the party’s hold over the jurisdiction’s political affairs. If this were the 
case, one would expect the VOTE coefficient to be negative. On the other hand, one may 
also argue that higher rates of ballots indicate voters’ greater motivation to register their 
dissatisfaction with the ruling party through the voting process. If this were the case, a 
high voting percentage indicates a stronger voter input into how the local governments will 
fulfill their policies. To the extent that the interests o f the citizenry are not coincident with 
the bureaucracy’s preferences, the jurisdictions having higher voter turnouts will exhibit
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characteristics that increase the probability of GARP violations, and one would expect the 
VOTE coefiBcient to be positive.
DENSITY is a measure o f locality population density per square kilometer, and 
CITY is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if jurisdiction i is an urban center, that is, a 
Municipality, and 0 otherwise. These two variables are admittedly highly correlated, but 
population density also varies greatly even among the sixteen Hsiens. For instance, the 
1986 data shows that two Hsiens, Hwalien and Taitung, have population densities as low 
as 78 persons per square kilometer, while the most populous Hsien (Taipei) has a density 
as high as 1,329 persons per square kilometer. The density in Taipei Hsien has increased 
to 1,589 persons per square kilometer in 1994, whereas the density in Hwalien Hsien 
remains constant during the period, and the density in Taitung has decreased to 73 persons 
per square kilometer. Because of this demographic differences among Taiwan’s Hsiens 
and Municipalities, these two are included as separate variables in the empirical model. 
It is a general perception in Taiwan that the educational level of voters is positively 
correlated with the degree of urbanization of a locality and that the influence o f the ruling 
KMT party is stronger in the more rural areas than in an urban center or a more densely 
populated locale. If the bureaucratic utility function reflects the preferences o f the ruling 
party, then local bureaucracies in the more urbanized jurisdictions, facing better educated 
citizens and weaker control from the top, are conceivably more likely to heed voters’ 
preferences rather than merely following the party line. The signs o f both variables are 
therefore expected to be positive.
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EMP/POP measures the ratio o f public sector employment to population in each 
jurisdiction and EMP/VOTER measures the ratio o f public sector employment to the 
number of eligible voters in each of the three elections. Both of these variables are 
included in an attempt to capture how the relative size o f civil service may affect local 
bureaucrats’ fiscal behavior. There are no prior expectations about signs of the coefficients 
associated with these two variables. Note that the EMP/VOTER measure is constructed 
using data on voters in the same way as in VOTE.
Several regional dummy variables are also included in the empirical model to 
capture any geographical differences that might exist. Following standard practices, the 
sixteen Hsiens and five Municipalities in Taiwan are grouped into four regions: north, 
south, east and west. The northern region, where the central bureaucracy is located, may 
have less tendency to display characteristics that affect GARP violations. If political 
control is inversely related to the distance between the local administrative unit and the 
central political machine, then it is not unreasonable to expect that regions that are farther 
away firom the central bureaucracy would have greater tendency to exhibit characteristics 
that violates GARP. Traditionally, the ruling party has, however, had a stronghold of the 
eastern region. Given these considerations, it is expected that the sign of the coefficient 
of EAST will be negative, meaning that the jurisdictions in the eastern region are less likely 
to have GARP violations, while the signs of the coefficients o f WEST and SOUTH will be 
positive, meaning that the jurisdictions in these regions are more likely to violate GARP.
To test the overall significance of the socio-economic characteristics included in 
the probit model in explaining GARP violations, a null hypothesis that none of the factors
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included in the probit model have any effects on bureaucratic behaviors against the 
alternative hypothesis that at least one of these jurisdiction-specific characteristics has an 
effect on bureaucratic behaviors can be constructed as follows;
(22) Hq: P2 =  P3 =  P4 =  Ps =  P6 =  P? =  Pg =  P9 =  Pio =  Pii = 0
Vs. H, : Not all Pfs are zero 
The likelihood ratio test, similar to that described earlier, is employed to test this 
hypothesis.^ Specifically, the test statistic LR is a random variable with degrees of 
fieedom equal to (k-1) = 10. The same likelihood ratio test procedure can also be applied 
to any subset o f the independent variables in the probit model to test whether the 
coefficients associated with these specific variables are jointly different fi-om zero. For 
example, it is easy to set up a null hypothesis that none of the regional dummy variables 
have any effects on bureaucratic behaviors that lead to GARP violations against the 
alternative hypothesis that at least one of the regional variables has some effect on 
bureaucratic behaviors. Similarly, the degrees o f fi-eedom for %^-test would be the number 
of coefficients included in the null hypothesis. For the significance of each individual 
socio-economic characteristic affecting bureaucratic behaviors, a test based on the 
asymptotic property of the t-distribution, which approximates a standard normal 
distribution, is used.
^Please see equations (12) and (13) and the likelihood ratio test procedure described on p. 
43 in this dissertation.
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4.5 J! The Probit Results
Since per capita GNP data at the local level is not available, two different 
measurements o f the variable INCOME are used. The first set of models uses per capita 
femily income (PY), defined as the grand total family income at the local level divided by 
local population, is used. The second set o f models uses average household income (FY), 
defined as the grand total family income divided by the number o f households. Several 
variants o f equation (21) are estimated for each income definition. Altogether, a total of 
fourteen models are fitted to the 1986-94 pooled data set.
The probit results are reported in Table 13. Columns labeled (1) through (7) are 
results firom probit models that use PY for the variable INCOME, while those labeled (8 ) 
through (14) are results fi-om models that use FY to measure INCOME. As before, 1(0*) 
represents the maximum likelihood estimator of the unrestricted log-likelihood function, 
whereas L(6q ) is the maximum likelihood estimator of the restricted (i.e. intercept only) 
log-likelihood function, that is, under the hypothesis that pj =... = P j i = 0. The pseudo-/?", 
also known as Likelihood Ratio Index (LRI) or McFadden’s /? ,^ is computed as:
(23) pseudo-/?^ = 1 - [1(8*) / L(do )]
This statistic has a value of 1 when the model is a perfect predictor, and a value of 0 when 
L(0*) = Z,(0Q ). Obviously, 0 ^ pseudo-/?^ s 1. Although this measure is analogous to the 
coefficient of determination in linear regression models, the value of pseudo-/?^ between 
0 and 1 has no intuitive meaning [Judge et al., (1985), p. 767; Judge et al., (1988), p. 794]. 
Nevertheless, it is reported together with other summary statistics, following standard 
practices.
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Table 13. Estimates of the Parameters of the Prohit Models for Determining 
GARP Violations'
Probit Models Wlth Per Capita Family Income
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CONSTANT -32707 -3.4909 -3.6954* -33033 -2.941 -3.1303 -5.3195***
(-1.405) (-1.541) (-1.681) (-1.418) (-1254) (-1347) (-3.003)
PY -.0057 -.0078* -.0075 -.0092** -.0085** -.0073 -.0084**
(-1.152) (-1.698) (-1.539) (-2.153) (-2.037) (-1.626) (-2.114)
NONPARTY .5305* .4976* .4008 .5373* .5248* .5839** .6240**
(1.771) (1.693) (1.406) (1.817) (1.769) (2.007) (2246)
VOTE .0512** .0536** .0535** .0576** .0561** .0576** .0684***
(1.975) (2.104) (2.142) (2247) (2.181) (2351) (3.019)
DENSITY -.0003 .0003** -.0001 -.0002 -.0003
(-1.068) (2238) (-.441) (-.689) (-.969)
CITY 2.0081** 1.0133*** 1.5173 1.7286* 1.9789** 1.1793***
(1.994) (2.803) (1.616) (1.745) (2.014) (3.508)
EMP/POP -406.74 -24124 -17732 -113.96 -295.90
(-1.363) (-.949) (0.658) (-1205) (-1.092)
EMP/VOTER 203.70 110.33 77.919 -55.097 113.50
(1.036) (.633) (.429) (-1.022) (.648)
SOUTH 2553 .1390 .1104 .0554 .0943
(.748) (.434) (.336) (.180) (.310)
EAST -1.4208 -1.4501 -1.4801 -1.4091 -1.3286
(-.587) (-.597) (-.607) (-.574) (-.544)
WEST .0628 -.0631 -.1443 .0055 .0065
(.184) (-.198) (-.450) (.016) (.019)
L(Q*Ÿ -72.96 -73.54 -75.03 -73.89 -73.49 -73.59 -7520
W -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45
X -^statistic 30.97*** 29.82*** 26.84*** 29.12*** 29.92*** 29.72*** 26.50***
pseudo-R* .1751 .1686 .1517 .1647 .1691 .1680 .1500
Percentage
ofRight .83 .82 .80 .82 .82 .82 .79
Predictions
(table con’d.)
a: Asymptotic t-values are in parentheses.
b: Estimated log-likelihood function values for the unrestricted models, 
c: Estimated log-likelihood function for the restricted (i.e. intercept only) models. 
*: Asymptotically significant at the 10% significance level.
**: Asymptotically significant at the 5% significance level.
***: Asymptotically significant at the 1% significance level.
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Probit Models With Average 1iousehold Income
Variables (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
CONSTANT -2.9232 -3.1605 -3.3626 -2.9501 -2.7068 -3.0125 -52176***
(-1255) (-IJ92) (-1.526) (-1265) (-1.158) (-1310) (-2.969)
FY -.0024* -.0029** -.0029** -.0032*** -.0030** -.0026** -.0029**
(-1.659) (-2.120) (-1.999) (-2.583) (-2.448) (-2.097) (-2.517)
NONPARTY 5116* .5510* .4544 .5916** .5787* .6024** .6495**
(1.906) (1.843) (1.568) (1.967) (1.918) (2.048) (2.309)
VOTE .0543** .0572** .0574** .0603** .0586** .0616** .0730***
(2.072) (2224) (2270) (2.344) (2273) (2.506) (3216)
DENSITY -.0003 .0003** -.0001 -.0002 -.0003
(-.950) (2.492) (-.489) (-.696) (-.921)
CITY 1.9457* 1.0151*** 1.5565* 1.7343* 1.9413** 1.1794***
(1.924) (3.010) (1.664) (1.767) (1.972) (3.652)
EMP/POP -321.61 -173.98 -99.175 -104.90 -263.92
(-I.06I) (.669) (0362) (-1.158) (-.984)
EMP/VOTER 148.68 66.596 26.989 -54.755 94.89
(.750) (.375) (.146) (-1.031) (.555)
SOUTH .1252 .0124 -.0267 -.0524 -.0055
(.351) (.037) (-.077) (-.166) (-.018)
EAST -1.5319 -1.5722 -1.5974 -1.5453 -1.4836
(-.635) (-.650) (-.658) (-.634) (-.611)
WEST .0466 -.0635 -.1547 .0055 .0101
(.136) (-.198) (-.480) (.016) (.030)
-1220 -72.66 -74.14 -72.76 -72.48 -72.63 -74.15
w -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45 -88.45
X*-statistic 32.50*** 31.58*** 28.62*** 31.38*** 31.94*** 31.64*** 28.60***
pseudo-/? .1837 .1786 .1618 .1774 .1806 .1788 .1617
Percentage
ofRight .84 .82 .80 .81 .82 .83 .80
Predictions
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As can be seen from the results reported in Table 13, several jurisdiction-specific 
socio-economic characteristics stand out as statistically significant determinants o f GARP 
violations across the various models for both the PY or FY specifications. Specifically, PY 
is asymptotically significant at the 1 0 % level in model (2 ) and asymptotically significant 
at the 5% level in models (4), (5) and (7). Similarly FY is asymptotically significant at the 
10% level for model (8 ), asymptotically significant at the 5% level for models (9), (10), 
(12), (13), and (14), and asymptotically significant at the 1% level for model (11). It is 
interesting to note the stability o f these coefiBcient estimates across all o f the models. It 
is also noteworthy that the estimated signs o f PY and FY coefficients in the fourteen 
models are all negative, indicating that higher income is associated with a lower probability 
of the jurisdiction exhibiting GARP violations, which is contrary to expectation. Perhaps 
higher income is just a manifestation of a relatively larger middle-class base in a given 
jurisdiction. The middle class , as a group, are usually believed to be more conservative, 
hence more likely to identify with the status quo. If such were the case, then the negative 
income factor estimates are perfectly justifiable.
Party membership (or rather, non-membership) of the elected magistrates and 
mayors appears to be a significant and positive determinant of GARP violations within the 
1986-94 sample. Except for models (3) and (10), in which the variable CITY is excluded, 
the NONPARTY coefficient estimate is asymptotically significant either at the 10% or 5% 
level in all other twelve model specifications. The positive estimates are consistent with 
prior expectation.
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Voter turnout (VOTE) is found to be another significantly positive factor affecting 
the likelihood of a jurisdiction’s exhibiting violations o f GARP. In all fourteen models the 
estimated coefiBcient o f this variable is asymptotically significant either at the 5% or 1% 
level. The positive sign of the estimate o f this variable indicates that the higher the voting 
percentage, the greater the probability of the Jurisdiction exhibiting GARP violations. As 
noted earlier, there are no prior expectations as to what effect this jurisdiction-specific 
characteristic may have on bureaucratic behaviors. The probit results, however, show that 
higher rate o f ballots is probably an indication of voters’ greater motivation in expressing 
their preferences through voting processes, rather than a result of the ruling party’s ability 
to mobilize voters. This observation is consistent with the expected effect of greater 
democratization.
DENSITY is found to be a significant determinant only when the variable CITY 
is excluded from the model. The estimated coefiBcient o f DENSITY is always found to be 
statistically insignificant and of the wrong sign when both are included in the model. The 
estimated coefiBcient o f CITY is always asymptotically significant and positive except for 
model (4), which is consistent with prior expectation. The probit results confirm the high 
correlation between DENSITY and CITY. In model (2) in which DENSITY is excluded 
firom the basic model of equation (2 1 ), the maximum likelihood estimator of the log- 
likelihood fimction is -73.54, which is also the log-likelihood function estimator of the 
restricted model of equation (21) under the hypothesis that P, (i.e. coefiBcient of 
DENSITY) = 0. The unrestricted estimator of the log-likelihood function for equation (21 ) 
[i.e. model (1)] is -72.96, the test statistic is therefore 2*| (-73.54) - (-72.96) | = 1.16. The
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critical value at the 5% significance level with 1 degree o f freedom is 3.841. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that Ps = 0 cannot be rejected at the 5% level. When model (3), in which 
CITY is excluded but DENSITY is included, is compared against model (1), the likelihood 
ratio is 2*| (-75.03) - (-72.96) | = 4.14, which is greater than the critical value at the 5% 
level, so the hypothesis that Pg (i.e. coefficient of CITY) = 0 is rejected. Comparisons of 
model (8 ) with (9) and of (8 ) with (10) also show that CITY is a better explanatory variable 
than DENSITY in the probit model.
Surprisingly, none of the employment and regional variables are found to be 
significant determinants o f GARP violations in the various specifications o f equation (21). 
When DENSITY, EMP/POP, EMP/VOTER, and the three regional variables are dropped 
from the model [i.e. models (7) and (14)], the remaining variables all have statistically 
significant estimates of the coefBcients. Model (7) is essentially a restricted version of 
model ( 1 ) under the hypothesis that Pj = P, = Pg = P, = p,o = P,i = 0 , so again a likelihood 
ratio test can be applied to test the null hypothesis. The test statistic is 2*| (-75.20) - 
(-72.96) I = 4.48 and the critical value at the 5% significance level with 6  degrees of 
freedom is 12.592, so that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Comparisons o f model 
(8 ) with (14), in which average household income is used in the place of per capita family 
income, yielded a similar result.
The likelihood ratio test is performed for each one of the fourteen variant models 
o f equation (21) to test the overall significance of the probit model in explaining GARP 
violations. In all cases the null hypothesis of no effects is rejected at the 1% significance 
level, indicating an overall relevance o f the variables included in the probit model for the
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explanation of GARP violations. These results are summarized in Table 14. The overall 
significance of the probit model is again confirmed by the rates o f successful predictions 
that are reported in Table 13. In all o f the fourteen cases, the percentage o f correct 
predictions based on each of the specified models is about 80%, which is generally a very 
good result.
In sum, the probit model of equation (21) is a robust specification. Moreover, for 
the 1986-94 sample o f Taiwan’s local public sector fiscal behavior, family income, party 
membership of the elected administrators, voting percentage and the status as a 
provincially designated municipality are all important determinants of GARP violations 
by local governments. The probit results also imply that the bureaucratic preference 
structure found to hold under the nonparametric tests reflects to some extent the 
preferences of the ruling KMT party. In general terms then, greater democratization and 
greater urbanization both appear to have a negative effect on the ruling party’s continued 
dominance in Taiwan.
Admittedly there may be other jurisdiction-specific socio-economic characteristics 
that are not captured by equation (2 1 ); identifying the additional factors affecting a 
locality’s tendency to violate the constrained optimization principles should be an 
interesting topic for future research.
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Model Critical Value* Degrees of Freedom X*-Statistic'’
Hypothesis
Testing^
( 1 ) 23.209 1 0 30.97 Reject Hq
(2 ) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 29.28 Reject Hq
(3) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 26.84 Reject Hq
(4) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 29.12 Reject Ho
(5) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 29.92 Reject Hq
(6 ) 18.475 7 29.72 Reject Hq
(7) 13.277 4 26.50 Reject Hq
(8 ) 23.209 1 0 32.50 Reject Hq
(9) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 31.58 Reject Hq
( 1 0 ) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 28.62 Reject Hq
( 1 1 ) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 31.38 Reject Hq
( 1 2 ) 2 1 . 6 6 6 9 31.94 Reject Hq
(13) 18.475 7 31.65 Reject Ho
(14) 13.277 4 28.60 Reject Ho
a: Critical values are from the distribution table at the 1% level o f significance, 
b: Source: Table 13.
c: For the overall relevance of the probit model.
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There exist a number of competing choice-theoretic economic structural models of 
state and local government fiscal behavior in public finance literature, yet no single 
tractable framework has gained wide acceptance as the structural model o f local fiscal 
behavior. The popular median voter model provides a foundation for demand aggregation 
under majority rule which conveniently circumvents the difBculty in aggregating 
unrestricted individual preferences, but is totally mute about the supply of goods and 
services in the public sector. Niskanen’s bureaucratic monopoly model, on the other hand, 
builds a supply-side fiamework for publicly provided goods and services. The public 
sector expenditure outcome predicted by the model, however, deviates from the median 
voter result. The Romer-Rosenthal bureaucratic agenda control model extends Niskanen’s 
concept of bureaucrats as budget maximizers to the median voter fiamework in the 
referendum setting, leading to a result that is also at odds with the outcome implied by the 
median voter model.
All of these models of public sector fiscal behavior can be, and have been, criticized 
one way or the other as being unrealistic in describing the real, and no doubt much more 
complex, world. The literature review in Chapter 2 points out that the theoretical validity 
of the median voter model critically hinges upon the single-peakedness o f voters’ 
preferences; without single-peakedness voting cycling is the likely result. The Niskanen 
model is questioned for its characterization of bureaucrats as budget maximizing agents. 
While the underlying logic of the Romer-Rosenthal model is not challenged, the
104
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development of the model within a referendum setting is deemed incomplete in view of the 
various forms of the public sector expenditure decision-making process, for instance, a 
committee setting or when no referendum is required [Holcome, (1989), p. 117]. One 
common feature o f those public choice models that incorporate electoral process into 
analysis is that strategic voting is simply assumed away. In reality, however, voters often 
have incentives to misrepresent their true preferences [Dixit and Nalebuff, (1991), pp. 259- 
85]. In the final analysis, none of these public choice models truly describe the real world. 
But then, none are intended to be accurately descriptive; the real test of a model lies in its 
empirical relevance.
The median voter model utilizes the indifference curve analysis for individual 
voters as both taxpayers and service recipients whose utilities are positive functions o f 
private and public goods consumption. The assumption o f utility maximization subject to 
a budget constraint for voters/taxpayers follows directly fi-om the application o f received 
microeconomic theory and underlies much of public choice theory since the 1970s. 
Bureaucratic models, such as that o f Niskanen and of Romer and Rosenthal, typically 
assume that bureaucratic utility is a positive function of budget size, the number o f 
employees, or other measures of “power” and “prestige” of the office. The utility 
maximization assumption for bureaucrats, or more precisely, for the bureaucracy as a 
whole, has not received the same rigorous treatment by public finance economists as the 
consumer choice-based models. To treat state and local expenditure results “as i f ’ they 
were the outcomes of bureaucratic constrained maximization is an ingenious invention, yet
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the appropriateness of making such an assumption and the empirical relevance of the model 
has not been directly addressed in the literature.
The current lack of definitive evidence regarding the validity of the bureaucratic 
utility fimction assumption represents a significant gap in the public choice literature. To 
fill this gap, this dissertation research directly tested the assumption that bureaucrats or the 
bureaucracy operates as if they have well-defined preferences over budgetary outcomes by 
analyzing local govermnent spending and employment data firom Taiwan during the 1986- 
94 period. Because of a long tradition of a single party dominance, Taiwan’s public sector 
data allows a researcher to isolate resource allocation decisions made by local 
bureaucracies with limited constraints from voters/taxpayers, thereby providing a unique 
opportunity for direct tests o f bureaucratic utility fimction assumption.
Both parametric and nonparametric test techniques have been employed to analyze 
the data set The parametric tests used a translog utility fimction specification for the nine 
cross-section and the pooled cross-section and time-series data sets. Consistent estimates 
of the parameters have been difBcult to obtain, except for the 1994 cross-section data. 
Failure to obtain satisfactory results prevented direct tests o f the utility maximization 
assumption. This illustrates the shortcoming of the test procedure based on specific 
fimctional form assumptions.
The nonparametric tests based on the theory of revealed preference were performed 
on the cross-section, time-series, and pooled data sets separately. For the nine cross- 
section local government data, all but the 1987 data set passed the GARP consistency tests. 
Even when the 1987 data set was found to violate GARP, the total number of violations
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were small relative to total potential violations. For the twenty-one time-series data sets, 
one for each local jurisdiction, all but two jurisdictions passed the GARP tests. And again, 
the number of violations o f GARP were small relative to total possible violations. For the 
pooled cross-section and time-series panel data set, 107 violations o f GARP were found, 
representing 0.13% and 0.0015% of possible violations of WARP and transitivity, 
respectively.
Although the parametric tests fail to provide guidelines for accepting or rejecting 
the assumption of utility maximization, it is possible to draw several meaningful 
conclusions based solely on the nonparametric results. Since the number of GARP 
violations in either the cross-section or time-series or pooled data set is really small 
relative to total possible violations, which may be attributable to measurement errors, 
omission of relevant variables or stochastic disturbances, this dissertation concludes that 
the observed data set strongly supports the hypothesis that the bureaucracies have well- 
defined preferences over public employment patterns. The cross-section and time-series 
results together strongly indicate the intertemporal stability in the preference structures 
across individual bureaucracies. Furthermore, the pooled data test results show a strong 
support for the assumption of bureaucratic utility maximization in Taiwan’s local 
government fiscal behavior.
The sensitivity analysis enabled this study to identify labor share values that would 
cause the observed data set to display inconsistency with GARP. The results from this 
sensitivity analysis greatly strengthen the conclusion of bureaucratic utility maximization 
in Taiwan’s local bureaucracies.
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The probit analysis using violation status found in the pooled data GARP test as the 
binary dependent variable further enabled this study to identify potential socio-politico- 
economic determinants of GARP violations. The level of income was found to have a 
negative effect on the likelihood that the local bureaucracy would deviate from utility 
maximization. More importantly, degree o f urbanization, voter turnout and party 
membership of the elected chief administrator in a jurisdiction were found to be significant 
determinants of local public sector bureaucratic behavior. Greater degree of urbanization, 
greater voting percentage as a result of democratization, and elected bureaucrats not 
belonging to the dominant ruling party all appear to increase the probability that the 
locality’s fiscal behavior will digress from that which maximizes bureaucratic utility.
Pooling all of the empirical evidence, this dissertation concludes that the local 
bureaucracy does have well-defined preferences and that the bureaucratic utility is an 
increasing function of public sector budget. This dissertation further concludes that the “as 
i f ’ proposition used in the public choice literature is justified. The probit results also 
suggest that researchers should take precautions when modeling the public sector fiscal 
behavior in emerging democracies via the bureaucratic approach, for although the 
assumption of constrained optimization is justified, the likelihood that it is not increases 
with each successful democratization process.
This dissertation study also points to a few avenues for future potential research. 
For example, it would be of great interest to see if the jurisdiction-specific socio-political 
factors found to have an effect on bureaucratic behavior continue to hold in Taiwan after 
five or ten years have elapsed. For an emerging democracy such as Taiwan, one would
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expect to find more and more GARP violations in each subsequent cross-section local 
public sector fiscal data if  those socio-political determinants found in this study are truly 
relevant. It would also be interesting to identify additional jurisdiction-specific socio­
political factors affecting local bureaucracy’s fiscal behavior. Another possible area of 
research is to test the international relevance of the bureaucratic utility hypothesis by 
performing GARP tests on public sector spending and employment data drawn firom 
countries with distinctive political traditions.
This dissertation study focused on providing direct empirical evidence to shed some 
light on the appropriateness of the assumption of constrained utility maximization in the 
local public sector. It has argued that the relevance of a theoretical model lies in its 
predictive power regardless the descriptive accuracy of the underlying assumptions. With 
the advent o f GARP, it is now possible to test the “as i f ’ depiction of decision-making in 
utility-maximization firamework. Moreover, the concept of GARP is both simple to 
understand and easy to use. It would therefore seem prudent for researchers to check data 
consistency before modeling so that the underlying assumptions regarding the agent’s 
preferences would not become questionable. The empirical evidence fi-om this dissertation 
research in no small way lends strong support to using the utility-maximization models as 
predictive models in general.
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APPENDIX A







input year ID district $ allem allex allw edem edex psem psex 















*Note = ALL EXPENSES ARE IN NTS 1,000;
*Note = Assuming wage expenses as a percentage of current account 
expenditures in each service category is the same as the 
wage/expenditures ratio at the local level;
* allem = total employment;
* allex = total current account expenditures;
*allw = total wage expenses;
*allwex = total wage expenses as a percentage of ALLEX;
*edem = employment in public education;
*edex = current account expenditures in public education;
*edw = wage expenses in public education;
*edaw = average wage rate in public education;
*psem = employment in public safety (police and fire protection); 
*psex = current account expenditures in public safety;
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*psw = wage expenses in public safety;
*psaw = average wage rate in public safety;
*phem = employment in public health;
*phex = current account expenditures in public health;
*phw = wage expenses in public health;
*phaw = average wage rate in public health;
*epem = employment in environmental protection;
*epex = current account expenditures in environmental protection;
*epw = wage expenses in environmental protection;
*epaw = average wage rate in environmental protection;
*misem = employment in all other functions;
*misex = current account expenditures in all other functions;
*misw = wage expenses in all other functions;
*misaw = average wage rate in all other functions;
proc print data=dl994; 
var id district allem edem psem phem epem misem allex edex psex phex epex 




yl = edw/allw; /*This is P,Xi/M in equation (10)*/
y2 = psw/allw; /*This is P 2 X2 /M in equation (II)* /
y3 = (allw - edw - psw)/allw; 
mis = allem - edem - psem;
Inedem = log(edem); /*This is /#iX, in equations (10), and (11)*/
Inpsem = log(psem); /*This is InX^ in equations ( 10), and (11)*/
Inmis = log(mis); /*This is fiiXj in equations (10), and (11)*/
run;
**.




model yl = Inedem Inpsem Inmis; 
model y2 = Inedem Inpsem Inmis; 
model y3 = Inedem Inpsem Inmis; 
run;
title 1 Tarametric Tests — Translog Utility Function';
title2 'Unrestricted Nonlinear Maximum Likelihood Procedures';
* * .
** yl = education labor’s share in total expenses;
** y2  = public safety labor’s share in total expenses;
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* * .
** SAS Nonlinear Maximum Likelihood Estimating Procedures;
** The following Is for Unrestricted NML;
* * .
proc model data=dl994_l;
var yl y2 Inedem Inpsem Inmis; 
parms al a2 b l l  b l2  bl3 b21 b22 b23 
b31b32b33b231b232b233; 
b lm l =bll+b21+b31; 
blm2 = bl2+b22+b32; 
blm3=bl3+b23+b33; 
b2ml =bll+b21+b231; 
b2m2 = bl2+b22+b232; 
b2m3=bl3+b23+b233;
y 1 =(al +b 1 1  *Inedem+b 1 2*lnpsem+b 13 *lnmis)/(- 1+blml * Inedem
+b 1 m2 * Inpsem+b 1 m3 * Irunis) ; 
y2=(a2+b21 * lnedem+b22 * lnpsem+b23 * lnmis) / ( - 1  +b2m 1 * Inedem
+b2m2* Inpsem+b2m3 * Inmis);
* * .
** Arbitrary starting values for the parameters;
* * .
fit yl y2
startKal .05 bl 1 -.05 b l2  .78 bl3 .2
b21 .44 b22 1.0 b23 - . 8  a2 -.49 b31 .006 b32.01 
b33 -.57 b231.03 b232 .62 b233 .41)/itsur 
maxiter= 1 0 0  converge= . 0 0 0 0 1  ;
run;
title2 'Restricted (symmetry and equality) Nonlinear ML';
** .
** The following is for Restricted NML;
* * .
proc model data=dl994_l; 
var yl y2 Inedem Inpsem Inmis; 
parms al a2 b l l  b l2  bl3 b22 b23 b33; 
bml = bl l+bl2+bl3; 
bm2 = bl2+b22+b23; 
bm3 = bl3+b23+b33;
yl=(al+bl 1 * Inedem+b 1 2 * Inpsem+b 13 * lnmis)/(-1 +bm 1 * Inedem 
+bm2* lnpsem+bm3 *lnmis);
y2=(a2+b 12 * lnedem+b22 * lnpsem+b23 * lnmis)/(-1 +bm 1 * Inedem 
+bm2* lnpsem+bm3 *lnmis);
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* * .
** Arbitrary starting values o f the parameters; 
fit yl y2
starK al .05 bl 1 -.05 b l2 .78 b l3  .2 b22 1.0 b23 - . 8  
a2 -.49 b33 -.57) /itsur maxiter=100 
converge=.0 0 0 0 1 ;
run;
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APPENDIX B
AN EXAMPLE OF THE SAS-IML PROGRAM 
FOR NONPARAMETRIC TESTS
/* This SAS-IML program for checking GARP is capable of:
(1) identifying violations (in pairs) of direct revealed preference (WARP);
(2) identifying violations (in pairs) of GARP;
(3) calculating and printing Varian's "R" and "V" matrices; and






read all var{id edaw psaw phaw epaw misaw /* See Appendix A for*/
edem psem phem epem misem} into m; /* variable names */
p = m[,2:6]; /* The wage matrix */
X = m[,7:11 ] ; /* The employment matrix*/
n = nrow(p);
y = p*x'; /*The matrix o f PX 'and P'X**/
z = vecdiag(y)*j(l,n); 
mm = z >= y; 
id = m[,l];
col={ "obsl" "obs2 " };
start program; /*Beginning of IML module called “program”*/
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Testing Direct Consistency 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .
test = y#0 ; 
list! = j( l , 2 ,0 ); 
do I = 1 to n; 
doj = (i+ l)ton;
i f  y[U ] >= y [ij]  & y [jj] <  y[j>i]
I <= y [ij]  & y [jj] >  yO,i]
I y [ ij ]  >= y[i,i] & yD.i] >=  yü J]
then go to aa; 
test[ij] = l;
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print,, "Nonparametric Tests — 1994 Data"; 
print,, "Identification="; print id; 
print,, test;
print,, "Violations of direct consistency (pairs)="; 
print listl [colname=col];
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Computing Transitivity 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .
V = y/z; 
pr = (z>y); 
w  = p r; 
mt = mm;
/* Varian’s value matrix 
/* Varian’s ‘PR’ matric
*/
*/
do k = 1  to n; 
do i = 1  to n; 
doj = 1  to n; 
var = mtpdc] & mt[kj]; 
mt[ij] = var o  mt[i j] ;  





/* This do-Ioop procedure follows*/ 
/* Varian’s (1982, p.972) algorithm*/
/* Varian's 'R' (= MT) matrix */
check = mt # w ;
if sum(check) > 0  then go to bbb; 
list2  = j(l, 2 ,0 ); 
v index= j(l,l, 0 );
print,, "This data set is consistent with transitivity"; 
print "***********************************".
print,, " Violations of GARP="; print list2 [colname=col]; 
print,, " Varian's violation index=" vindex; 
go to ccc;
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
bbb: print,, "This data set violates transitivity"; 
print"******************************";
print,, check;
Iist2 = j(l,2,0); 
vindex = j( l ,  1,0); 
do i=l to n; 
doj= l to n;
if  checkp j]= l  then list2=list2//(id[i,]||idD,]); 
if  checkpj]=l then vindex=vindex + v[j j ]  - v[j,i]; 
end; 
end;
print,, " Violations o f GARP="; print Iist2 [coIname=col]; 
print,, " Varian's violation index=" vindex;
ccc: print,„"Matrices used to check utility maximization";
print"********************************************".
print "Price Matrix="; print p;
print,, "Quantity Matrix="; print x;
print,, "Expenditure Matrix="; print y;
print,, "Matrix formed by diagonal elements="; print z;
print,, "Varian's value matrix="; print v;
print,, "Direct revealed preference, '! ' indicates
Varian's 'R°' (see Varian (1982))"; print,, mm; 
print,, "Varian's 'R' matrix, '! ' indcates Varian's
transitive closure, 'R' (see Varian (1982))"; print mt; 
print,, "Varian's TR' matrix, 'T indicates Varian's 
(see Varian (1982))"; print pr;








NOTE: To run the sensitive analysis, the above IML program is revised to include the 
iterative procedures as following:
proc IML; 
use dl994;
read all var{id} into id; 
read all var{edem} into edem; 
read all var {psem} into psem; 
read all var{phem} into phem; 
read all var{epem} into epem; 
read all var{misem} into misem; 
read all var{edex} into edex; 
read all var(psex} into psex; 
read all var{phex} into phex; 
read all var(epex} into epex; 
read all var{misex} into misex; 
read all var{allw} into allw; 














dob=l to 100; 
D=D+1; 
H=D/100;
/* Beginning of the iterative procedures */ 
/* for the sensitive analysis */
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edw=G*edex; /* Calculation of labor share in education*/
edaw=edw/edem;
psw=H*psex; /* Calculation of labor share in public safety*/
psaw=psw/psem;
p = edaw||psaw||phaw||epaw||niisaw;
X = edem||psem||phem|lepem||misem; 
n = nrow(id); 
y = p*x';
z = vecdiag(y)*j(l^); 
mm = z >= y; 
col={ "obsl" "obs2"};
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Testing Direct Consistency 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .
(same as the above IML example from the line 
of “start program” down to the end of the “ccc" 
subroutine.)
end;
end; /* End o f the iterative procedures for the */
finish; /* sensitive analysis. There are 10,000 */
run program; /* iterations for the tests of GARP */
quit;
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